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Abstract
The European Union’s sugar policy, in place since 1968, underwent its ﬁ  rst major reform 
in 2005 in response to mounting and unsustainable imbalances in supply and demand. 
The reform, however, targeted only a few policy instruments (intervention price cut, 
voluntary production quota buyout, and restrictions on nonquota sugar exports), while 
leaving other key policies unchanged (interstate quota trading, sugar-substitute competi-
tion, and import barriers). Consequently, the extent of the reform’s impact is limited, 
compared with more far-reaching alternatives, particularly when the oligopolistic nature 
of the industry and its noncompetitive pricing behavior are taken into account. A model-
based analysis suggests that the reforms by themselves are unlikely to induce price 
adjustments sufﬁ  cient to reduce overproduction unless quotas and/or high tariffs are 
reduced. 
Keywords: European Union, EU, sugar CMO, Common Market Organization, policy 
reform, trade, economic model 
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Summary
The European Union (EU) is one of the leading sugar producers and traders 
in the world. This position was built over time through the application of 
protectionist policies that regulated production, prices, exports, and imports. 
Since its creation in 1968, the existing EU sugar policy—commonly referred 
to as the Common Market Organization (CMO) for sugar—had changed only 
marginally. In 2006, however, a new sugar regime took effect, largely inﬂ  u-
enced by three factors: tariff- and quota-free access to least developed coun-
tries (LDCs) beginning in 2009, which would likely result in increased sugar 
imports; enforcement of World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments; 
and the accession of 10 new member states to the EU in 2004, which exacer-
bated preexisting sugar supply-and-demand imbalances. 
What Is the Issue?
The EU sugar policy was reformed under multiple pressures, both internal 
and external. The reform package targeted a limited set of policy instruments, 
such as support prices and quotas, with the hope of improving the efﬁ  ciency 
of the industry and making it more sustainable. However, the partial nature 
of the reform, which left several key policy interventions unchanged, raises 
concerns about the implications of the reform on the EU sugar industry and 
on international trade. Because the EU is the world’s second largest producer 
and exporter of sugar and the third largest importer, the EU sugar reforms 
have important consequences for both global and U.S. sugar markets. 
This report examines the current EU sugar regime and uses a model-based 
approach to assess the potential market and trade implications of the imple-
mented reforms.
What Did the Study Find?
Current sugar regime—The CMO for sugar is complex, encompassing a 
variety of policy instruments, including price support, production quotas 
(sugar and substitutes), export subsidies, and import barriers. The reforms 
targeted only a few of these instruments, principally cutting the intervention 
price, or the price guaranteed to EU producers. The 36-percent cut in the 
intervention price is designed to lower the market price and discourage sugar 
imports from LDCs. The reforms also included a voluntary buyout scheme 
for production quotas and a disallowance of exports of nonquota sugar, a 
step taken with the aim of reducing domestic production and bringing export 
subsidies within WTO limits.
The reforms did not address interstate quota trading (which could induce 
a signiﬁ  cant shift in production from high- to low-cost regions), leaving in 
place, as before, national quota allocation. The reforms also retained produc-
tion quotas on sugar substitutes (isoglucose, or high-fructose corn syrup), 
albeit at higher levels, preventing greater competition within the EU among 
different types of sweeteners.
Model-based results—According to a model-based analysis of the reform, 
the combined effect of cuts in prices and production quotas will lead to lower 
EU sugar production, lower prices for consumers, and higher consumption. iv
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Moreover, when the prices of sugar substitutes go down, reducing the proﬁ  t-
ability of isoglucose production and, hence, its output, sugar consumption 
will rise. In all model scenarios, EU sugar exports decline as a result of a 
combination of lower production, lower export subsidies, and restrictions on 
exports of nonquota sugar. Consequently, EU sugar imports will have to rise 
to bring the market into balance.
When the model accounts for oligopolistic industry behavior, results 
show that EU sugar production will decline further than it would under 
the reform package’s quota buyout scheme. Domestic market prices will 
not necessarily fall as much (or proportionally) as the cut in the inter-
vention price, partly due to increased markups charged by sugar ﬁ  rms. 
Model results also show that EU sugar reform will lead to a signiﬁ  cant 
exit of ﬁ  rms from the industry. This effect is consistent with the acceler-
ated restructuring and consolidation of EU sugar processors that has been 
observed in the period following the reforms.
Market and trade implications—The analysis suggests that, given the 
market structure of the EU sugar industry, cutting the intervention price 
alone may not have the desired effect on production and market prices. 
The reform’s impact on production and prices will likely depend more on 
how much sugar is actually removed from the market, which will be partly 
determined by the extent of the sugar industry consolidation currently 
under way. A more complete sugar sector reform that included lower 
import barriers (outside preferential agreements), interstate quota trad-
ability, and greater market opportunities for sugar substitutes would have 
weakened oligopolistic behavior, thus having the potential to make the 
industry leaner and more competitive. 
The reform’s trade effects are more signiﬁ  cant for preferential than for 
nonpreferential exporters to the EU. The near concurrent implementa-
tion of tariff-cutting measures in 2009 and the sugar reform in 2006 will 
dampen potential gains for LDCs with preferential access to the EU as they 
face greater competition from third-country (nonpreferential) exporters. 
Preferential exporters are likely to experience income loss (from prefer-
ence erosion) despite possible increases in sugar exports to the EU. World 
sugar prices are expected to shift upward due to the EU sugar reform, but an 
even greater inﬂ  uence on prices may be rising demand for and production of 
sugar-based ethanol, mostly from Brazil. A tighter world sugar market and 
rising prices would beneﬁ  t developing-country sugar exporters, partly offset-
ting export losses from the EU reform. 
Finally, the EU sugar reform could have implications for the WTO. The 
reform not only reduces EU export subsidies to a level within current WTO 
limits, but it also might facilitate a phased removal of export subsidies by the 
EU as is called for in the Doha Development Round. In the area of domestic 
support, cuts in the intervention price and lower production would reduce the 
EU’s aggregate measure of support. However, in the area of market access, 
the EU reform does not address the high import tariff barriers for sugar 
exporters outside preferential agreements. Reducing these import barriers 
could potentially have far greater impact on world sugar markets, including 
nonpreferential sugar trade. v
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How Was the Study Conducted?
This analysis of the EU sugar reform features qualitative and quantita-
tive components. The qualitative assessment offers insights into the likely 
shifts in production, prices, and trade resulting from the reform, given key 
characteristics of the sugar industry. Due to the complexity of the EU sugar 
regime and the various interconnected issues to disentangle, the quantitative 
assessment of the reform required use of both partial and general equilibrium 
models. The partial equilibrium-based analysis incorporates details of the 
EU domestic sugar sector and policies, and the general equilibrium model 
directly addresses bilateral trade, distinguishing between preferential and 
nonpreferential trade ﬂ  ows and offering an account of both import and export 
policies. A unique contribution of this report is its explicit modeling of 
imperfect competition and the oligopolistic behavior of the EU sugar industry 
and how these attributes affect the expected responses to the policy reform.1
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Introduction
The European Union (EU) is one of the leading sugar producers and traders 
in the world. However, this position was built over time through the applica-
tion of protectionist policies that regulated all aspects of the industry, ranging 
from production and prices to exports and imports. The existing EU sugar 
policy—commonly referred to as the Common Market Organization (CMO) 
for sugar—incorporates a set of market management tools, including an 
intervention price and production quotas. The CMO for sugar also includes 
export subsidies to dispose of excess supply, preferential trade arrangements 
for certain countries outside the EU, and high tariffs to insulate domestic 
producers from foreign competition.
Since its creation in 1968, the CMO for sugar has changed only margin-
ally. In 1973, the United Kingdom (UK) acceded to the EU. As a result, the 
UK’s preferential import commitments to its former colonies—the Africa-
Caribbean-Paciﬁ  c (ACP) countries—were incorporated within the CMO 
for sugar. In each of the attempts to reform the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP)—including the 1992 MacSharry Reform, Agenda 2000, and 
the 2003 CAP reform—the sugar regime has virtually escaped reform.1 
But following the 2003 CAP reform, a combination of several internal and 
external factors created a greater sense of urgency to modify the sugar policy. 
First, the “Everything-But-Arms” (EBA) Initiative, in which the EU agreed 
to phase out tariffs by 2009 on imported raw sugar from 48 of the least devel-
oped countries (LDCs), opened the doors for additional preferential sugar 
imports. Second, a World Trade Organization (WTO) panel ruled that the 
EU sugar regime is in violation of the EU’s WTO export commitments. This 
ruling requires the EU to stop out-of-quota sugar exports (which, according 
to the WTO, beneﬁ  t from indirect subsidies through cross-subsidization) and 
include in the calculations of its export subsidies the amount for re-exported 
reﬁ  ned sugar made from raw imported sugar. To comply, the EU will be 
required to reduce its sugar exports and expenditures on export subsidies 
by a signiﬁ  cant amount—from around 4 to 5 million tons per year to 1.3 
million tons in volume and to 499 million euros in value. In practice, this 
reduction could make it no longer proﬁ  table for the EU to produce sugar 
outside the quota system, at least for food uses. Third, the enlargement of 
the EU from 15 to 25 countries (EU-15 to EU-25) in 2004 has exacerbated 
the EU’s preexisting supply and demand imbalances of sugar.2  While the 10 
new member states from Central and Eastern Europe made a net contribu-
tion to EU sugar consumption, they also imported sugar from third countries 
(Australia, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and Guatemala). Thus, the enlarged EU-25 
was required to compensate these third-country exporters under WTO rules 
with additional “current access” quotas,3 estimated at around 490,000 tons 
(Huan-Niemi, 2003).4 Together, these factors made a signiﬁ  cant overhaul of 
the EU sugar regime almost inevitable.
A comparison of expected supply and demand projections over the short 
term reveals the severity of the market imbalance. Excess sugar supply, 
already chronic in the EU, is expected to worsen under the combined effect 
of export reductions resulting from EU compliance with the WTO ruling 
and implementation of the EBA Initiative. According to per year estimates 
from the Commission of the European Communities (2005), domestic sugar 
 1 The one major exception occurred 
in 1995, when the EU agreed to reduce 
its export subsidies by 21 percent in 
volume and 36 percent in value over the 
period 1995-2001 as part of the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).
 2 The accession of Romania and 
Bulgaria, effective January 2007, is not 
included in the present analysis.
 3 As part of the WTO AoA, mem-
bers were required to maintain current 
import access opportunities for tarifﬁ  ed 
products at levels corresponding to 
those existing during the 1986-88 base 
period. Where such “current” access 
had been less than 5 percent of domestic 
consumption of the product in ques-
tion in the base period, an (additional) 
minimum access opportunity had to be 
opened on a Most-Favored-Nation basis. 
This requirement was to ensure that in 
1995, current and minimum access op-
portunities combined represented at least 
3 percent of base-period consumption.
 4 All measurements in tons in this 
report refer to metric tons.2
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consumption (15.2 million tons) plus WTO-permissible exports (1.3 million 
tons) would fall far short of absorbing the supply from domestic production 
(19.8 million tons) plus agreement-bound preferential sugar imports (1.6 
million tons), unless the EU modiﬁ  ed its sugar regime. After accounting for 
high-end estimates of EU sugar imports from the EBA countries of around 3 
million tons, excess supply could have reached 7-8 million tons had the EU 
not changed its sugar policies.
Beginning in 2005, the EU embarked on a reevaluation of its sugar poli-
cies. On July 14, 2004, the EU Commission published an initial proposal 
and modiﬁ  ed it following the unfavorable WTO ruling on EU export subsi-
dies for sugar. Member states reached a ﬁ  nal agreement on a new sugar 
policy regime on November 24, 2005. The reforms were ratiﬁ  ed by the EU 
Parliament on January 19, 2006, and later by the Council of Ministers on 
February 22, 2006. The new sugar policy entered into effect on July 1, 2006. 
This report examines the current EU sugar regime and uses a model-based 
approach to assess the potential market and trade implications of the imple-
mented reforms.3
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Overview of the Common Market 
Organization for Sugar
The main objective of the CMO for sugar is to ensure sugar production in 
all member states where sugar beet production is feasible, regardless of cost 
competitiveness. National production quotas given to sugar processors based 
on historical production levels serve to accomplish this goal. The EU also 
operates an intervention price—a price guaranteed to producers—as the basis 
for intervention purchases. Moreover, it shields sugar from competition via 
several mechanisms. First, the EU imposes restrictive quotas on imports 
of sugar substitutes, such as isoglucose; high import tariffs protect against 
foreign competition. Export subsidies help to dispose of excess sugar supply 
and maintain high domestic prices. Also, sugar-using industries receive 
subsidies to compensate for the high price of sugar.
The EU-25 harvested 2.3 million hectares of sugar beets in 2005, with an 
average yield of 61.6 tons per hectare (Bureau et al., 2007). Productivity of 
sugar beet production varies signiﬁ  cantly across the EU (ﬁ  g. 1). The number 
of sugar beet processing plants in the EU-15 shrank from 240 in 1990 to 135 
in 2002/03 (table 1), while the number of sugarcane reﬁ  neries fell to 6. With 
the EU’s 2004 enlargement, about 100 sugar processing plants from the 10 
acceding countries were added to the EU sugar sector. But by 2005, the total 
number of plants declined to 184, and sugar production totaled about 21 
million tons. The EU-25’s ﬁ  rst and second largest sugar producers, Germany 
and France, account for about half of the EU-25’s production, followed by 
Poland, Italy, and the UK.
Production Quotas
For 2005, the total quota amount for sugar production in the EU-25 is 17.4 
million tons. The sugar quota allocated may be transferred between proces-
sors within member states but not between member states. 
Figure 1
Estimated marginal cost for sugar across EU member states, 2003
Estimated marginal cost (Euro/metric ton)
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While the quota allocation can be revised yearly, in practice it is changed 
only in the case of the closure or merger of sugar beet processors. Cane 
reﬁ  neries procure raw sugar through imports from third countries or overseas 
territories of the member states. Production quotas have changed little over 
the years, even though production began to exceed consumption in the EU 
around 1977. Production quotas were cut for the ﬁ  rst time in 2000, and this 
cut was 3.3 percent.
A distinctive feature of the CMO for sugar, compared with CAP regula-
tions for other agricultural products, is that the policy instruments target the 
sugar beet processors and sugarcane reﬁ  neries, not the sugar beet growers. 
Processors procure sugar beets from growers on the basis of intratrade agree-
ments deﬁ  ned by the CMO for sugar. These contractual agreements deﬁ  ne 
standard sugar and beet qualities and set purchase terms for beets and rules 
for quota transfers between enterprises. Based on the quota allocated to sugar 
beet processors, the processors, in turn, assign “beet delivery rights” to indi-
vidual growers as speciﬁ  ed in the intratrade agreements.
Quotas comprise two quota types: “A-quota” (82 percent of total quota 
allocations), and supplemental “B-quota” (18 percent) to cover year-to-year 
production variability due to weather or unexpectedly low yields. Like the 
Table 1
EU sugar industry, 2002-03
      White sugar  Sugar beet  Production
Country  Factories  Companies  yield   yield (t/ha)  + carryover  A sugar  B sugar  C sugar
  ——— Number ———  —— Tons/ha ——  ——————— 1,000 tons ———————
        
Austria 3  1  10.3  68.4  454.0  314.0  73.0  67.0
Belgium 8  6  10.4  66.0  888.0  675.0  145.0  68.0
Denmark 3 1  9.3 57.1 501.0  325.0  96.0 80.0
Finland 2  1  5.3  38.6  166.0  133.0  13.0  20.0
France 34  17  11.6  77.5  4,105.0  2,789.0 752.0 564.0
Germany 28  7  8.8  58.9 3,798.0 2,613.0  804.0  381.0
Greece 5  1  7.2  73.1  370.0  289.0 29.0 52.0
Ireland 2  1  6.3  52.3  223.0  181.0  18.0  24.0
Italy 20  9 5.7  51.8  1,563.0  1,311.0  162.0  90.0
The Netherlands  5  2  9.6 60.0 953.0 684.0  180.0 89.0
Portugal 4 4  9.0 62.5  56.0  56.0  0.0 0.0
Spain 13  3  10.4  76.8  1,086.0  957.0 40.0 90.0
Sweden 2  1  8.0  48.5  427.0  335.0  33.0  59.0
United Kingdom  6  2  9.7 64.7  1,260.0  1,035.0  104.0  121.0
EU-15 countries   135  56  8.7  61.8  15,850.0  11,697.0 2,449.0 1,705.0
Czech Republic   12  8  6.7  44.0  474.9 441.2 13.7 20.0
Hungary 6 5  5.4  40.0  401.7  400.5  1.2  0.0
Lithuania 4 2  4.9 35.0 112.0  103.0  0.0 9.0
Latvia 2  2  4.9 34.0  66.5  66.4  0.1 0.0
Poland 54  57  6.6  40.0  1,772.5  1,580.0  91.9 100.6
Slovakia 5 4  5.0  32.0  207.5  189.8 17.7  0.0
Slovenia 1 1  5.3  45.0  53.0  48.2  4.8  0.0
EU-25 total  219 135  8.3  58.2  18,938.1 14,526.1 2,578.4 1,834.6
Source: USDA, ERS using data from EU Commission and from Comité Européen des Fabricants de Sucre (CEFS).5
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U.S. sugar program, the CMO for sugar is designed to be self-ﬁ  nanced (i.e, 
it falls outside the EU budget), so a levy is imposed on sugar quota produc-
tion. A-sugar is charged 2 percent of the intervention price (12.60 euros per 
ton of sugar); B-sugar is charged a variable levy determined by the total cost 
of export refunds but has a maximum level set at 37.5 percent (237 euros per 
ton) of the intervention price. Sugar beet processors pay the levies, though 
they, in turn, pass on a portion of the cost to growers (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2005). If these levies prove insufﬁ  cient to cover the 
costs of the export subsidy, an additional levy is imposed as a percentage of 
the amount owed by each processor under the previous two levies, with no 
maximum set to achieve the sum required.
Sugar produced outside the quota is called C-sugar (nonquota sugar). The 
price guarantee applies only to quota sugar (A and B). Hence, nonquota sugar 
is ineligible for any price support, nor can it be sold on the domestic market. 
C-sugar may be exported, but it cannot receive export subsidies. A carryover 
mechanism is available for C-sugar, which involves storing the sugar for 
a minimum period of 12 months (i.e., “carried over” to the next marketing 
year). Carried-over C-sugar is treated as A-sugar in the following marketing 
year, but the carryover amount of C-sugar cannot exceed 20 percent of the 
A-sugar quota (see table 1).
Sugar beet processors in member states that produce C-sugar average 
around 3 million tons of C-sugar per year, most of which is exported. Even 
though C-sugar receives no direct export subsidies, it is sold proﬁ  tably at 
world market prices because the prices obtained for sales of A- and B-sugar 
(export subsidy inclusive) are high enough to cover all the ﬁ  xed costs of 
the processing companies. This cross-subsidization (where C-sugar holders 
beneﬁ  t indirectly because of the subsidies they receive on A- and B-sugar) 
was a key issue raised against the EU in the 2005 WTO ruling on export 
subsidies. According to the WTO Appellate Body, total subsidized sugar 
exports by the EU, including C-sugar, amount to almost 4 million tons per 
year, which far exceed the EU’s WTO commitment limit of 1.273 million 
tons per year. With ACP sugar re-exports added to its total, the EU spends 
nearly 1.3 billion euros per year on export subsidies, more than twice the 
ofﬁ  cial ceiling (and WTO notiﬁ  ed amount) of 499 million euros from 2000 
to 2001 and later (Agra Europe, 2004).
The CMO does not cover sugar produced for certain industrial uses, and 
non-CMO sugar does not qualify for any CMO support. Consequently, there 
is no limit on non-CMO sugar production. This provision applies to sugar 
processed into alcohol, including fuel ethanol, rum, and spreadable syrups, 
and sugar used to produce yeasts. Currently, France is the EU’s leading 
producer of sugar for nonfood purposes. In 2004, France reported harvesting 
about 40,000 hectares of sugar beets annually for nonfood purposes, of which 
about 10,000 hectares were used for ethanol extraction (Bruhns et al., 2004).
Sugar Substitutes
In 1977, the CMO for sugar was extended to production of isoglucose syrup 
to limit the product’s competitive effect on the protected sugar industry. 
Isoglucose, also referred to as high-fructose syrup (HFS), is extracted from 
maize, wheat, and starch potato and is subject to an annual production quota 6
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of 500,000 tons for the EU-25. Unlike quotas for sugar, quotas for isoglu-
cose are not eligible for purchase among member states; hence, they have 
no intervention prices. Since 1994, inulin syrup, another sweetener covered 
by the CMO for sugar, has been subject to a 300,000-ton per year quota (for 
the EU-15). Inulin syrup is treated the same as isoglucose in terms of quota 
restrictions but is more expensive to produce.
The cost of producing isoglucose in the EU has always been lower than the 
cost of producing sugar. A recent UK study shows that the production cost of 
isoglucose varies from 350 to 380 euros per ton, depending on the type. This 
cost range compares favorably with the breakeven price for sugar (below 
which it is no longer proﬁ  table to produce), which ranges from 300 to 350 
euros per ton in some “low-cost” regions of France to 500 to 550 euros per 
ton in Italy (Commission of the European Communities, 2005). As early as 
1995, the price of isoglucose was about 13-percent lower than the price of 
sugar in the EU, and the price is consistently below the intervention price of 
631.90 euros per ton for white sugar. Given this price advantage, the prin-
cipal factor that prevents a major substitution of isoglucose for sugar is the 
tight production quota on isoglucose. Nevertheless, in the EU, isoglucose 
prices follow sugar prices very closely and, therefore, would be affected by 
any reform to sugar prices or quotas. By contrast, inulin is a poor substitute 
for sugar, because inulin syrup is more expensive to produce (Netherlands 
Economic Institute, 2000).
Intervention Prices and Purchases
The EU maintains a minimum price for sugar via a two-tier strategy featuring 
a minimum price for sugar beets and an intervention price for white reﬁ  ned 
sugar. Intratrade agreements between sugar processors and beet growers 
regulate the relationship between the minimum sugar beet price (paid to 
growers) and processed sugar prices. Under the CMO for sugar, the basic 
beet price is the key support price. In 2005, the basic beet price was 4.767 
euros per 100 kilograms. The basic beet price is a function of the intervention 
price for sugar, and its derivation takes into account the processing margin, 
the yield of sugar from beets, the revenue from molasses sales, and the cost 
of beet delivery to processors (table 2). Sugar processing returns (if sugar 
is sold into intervention) are split approximately 58 percent to sugar beet 
growers (i.e., 36.6 euros per 100 kilograms at the present intervention price) 
and 42 percent to processors (26.5 euros per 100 kilograms). The growers’ 
share of 36.6 euros per 100 kilograms of sugar corresponds to the basic beet 
price of 4.767 euros per 100 kilograms on the basis of 7.7 tons of standard 
quality sugar beets (16 percent sugar content) being needed to produce 1 ton 
of sugar.
From the “basic price” of sugar beets is derived the minimum price actually 
paid to beet producers. Sugar processors are required to pay the minimum 
price, which is the basic beet price minus 58 percent of the production levies. 
The 2-percent levy set for A-type sugar beets raises the unit price of sugar 
to 46.72 euros per 100 kilograms, and the higher levy on B-type sugar beets 
raises its price to 32.42 euros per 100 kilograms (table 2).7
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Components of the Intervention Price
The intervention price for white reﬁ  ned sugar is the price that the govern-
ment agrees to pay to reﬁ  neries on the basis that sugar beet processors will 
pay the growers the minimum beet price. In 2005, the intervention price was 
set at 63.19 euros per 100 kilograms. An equivalent intervention price is 
derived for raw sugar of a standard quality at 52.37 euros per 100 kilograms 
(83 percent of the white sugar intervention price) and is the price paid for raw 
cane sugar imported from the ACP countries. The sugar intervention price 
is increased for deﬁ  cit regions (where consumption exceeds production); the 
premium equals the transport cost from the nearest surplus region. The sugar 
beet price is increased in a similar manner for deﬁ  cit regions. The CMO 
for sugar also provides additional assistance to the sugar industry, namely 
“reﬁ  ning aid,” which is granted to the sugarcane reﬁ  ning industry and covers 
certain costs of reﬁ  ning raw cane sugar.
For out-of-quota sugar (C-sugar), the price paid is determined by the returns 
to beet processors from sales of C-sugar on the world market. Although 
the CMO for sugar does not stipulate how much growers should be paid 
for C-sugar beets, intertrade agreements show that beet growers generally 
receive about 58 percent of exporting sugar processors’ receipts for C-sugar. 
Usually, beet growers are paid for the C-sugar beets at the end of the 
marketing season, when all C-sugar has been exported.
Intervention purchases are the enabling mechanism backing intervention 
prices. However, intervention purchases are rare, as processors are able to 
export sugar with subsidies at prices typically above intervention prices. 
Only once in the last 25 years has sugar been offered to the intervention 
agencies: in marketing year 1986/87, the German Intervention Agency 
bought 15,703 tons of white sugar (Netherlands Economic Institute, 2000). 
In 2005, a substantial intervention store amounting to 850,000 tons resulted 
from countries overproducing in anticipation of the reforms. Moreover, 
the EU was forced to declassify to C-sugar nearly 1.9 million tons of quota 
sugar, which would have had to be exported with subsidies, thus exceeding 
the WTO limit.
Table 2
Components of the intervention price
  Euros per 100 kilograms of: 
Item  White sugar  Sugar beets
Intervention price, white sugar  63.19
Transport cost of sugar beets  -4.41
Processing cost  -24.36
Value of molasses for beet growers  2.25
White sugar price in beets  36.67  4.767
(Price paid to beet growers)
Minimum beet price for A-sugar
(98 percent of basic price)    4.662
Minimum beet price for B-sugar    2.884
(60.5 percent of basic beet price)
Souce: USDA, ERS using data from Swedish Competition Authority (2002).8
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Subsidies to Sugar-Using Industries
About 70 percent of total human sugar consumption in the EU comes from 
food and drinks, while the remainder is directly consumed. Sugar-using 
industries that beneﬁ  t from production refunds under the CMO include 
the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, which receive compensation 
that effectively equalizes the prices that they pay to producers outside the 
EU. With production refunds, these industries (which represent less than 2 
percent of total sugar consumption) are able to buy sugar at the equivalent 
of world market prices plus shipping costs. The production refund is ﬁ  xed 
quarterly at a level equal to the average of the export refunds for a deﬁ  ned 
reference period minus 6.45 euros per 100 kilograms of white sugar equiva-
lent. This deduction has the effect of denying the chemical industry sugar 
at world prices and forces the industry to use molasses or starch as its prin-
cipal raw material. Food processors that use sugar also beneﬁ  t from export 
refunds. Export refunds are ﬁ  xed monthly and apply to sugar exported in 
processed products. This refund is ﬁ  xed as a unit rate multiplied by the sugar 
content of the products. The sugar export refunds for processed products 
containing sugar operate in export transactions similar to the way that the 
EU’s ingredient-based tariffs on processed foods and beverages containing 
sugar operate in import transactions. 9
The EU Sugar Policy Regime and Implications of Reform / ERR-59  
Economic Research Service/USDA
EU Sugar and Trade Policies 
The EU’s external sugar trade is highly managed within the current CMO, 
principally through three instruments: “export refunds,” contractual preferen-
tial agreements with third countries, and high import duties for nonpreferen-
tial sugar, including special safeguards. These policies regulate the two-way 
ﬂ  ow of sugar and have placed the EU in the unusual position of being both a 
signiﬁ  cant importer and an exporter of sugar (ﬁ  g. 2).
Export Subsidies
Export subsidies form the key mechanism to dispose of surplus production 
and maintain high internal prices. Refunds are paid from the collected levies 
for all exported (A+B) sugar obtained from sugar beets or cane harvested in 
the EU and from sugar imported under the Protocol Agreement with India 
and the ACP countries. Export subsidies enable sugar producers/exporters 
to receive a guaranteed price for exported sugar, equivalent to the price 
they would receive in domestic markets. Export subsidies are intended to 
cover the difference between the EU price and the world price for sugar, 
allowing the sugar to be sold on the world market. Maximum export refunds 
are equal to the white sugar intervention price plus the shipping cost to the 
port (5 euros), minus the world price. The sum of export refunds plus the 
world market price gives producers nearly 670 euros per ton of sugar, inclu-
sive of transport costs. Compared with the minimum price received in the 
EU internal market of 670 euros per ton (intervention plus transport costs), 
export refunds averaged 443 euros per ton for 2001/02, 485 euros per ton for 
2002/03, and 480 euros per ton for 2003/04. Export subsidies can account 
for up to 75 percent of the EU intervention price. As shown in table 3, export 
refunds for EU sugar have remained fairly steady over the past decade.
Export subsidies are particularly critical to the large EU-based confectioners 
competing in world markets when one of the principal components of their 
Figure 2
Structure of EU sugar trade, 2004
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exported product is sugar priced at roughly three times the world price. The 
EU has also used export subsidies to re-export 1 to 2 million tons of imported 
sugar under the Sugar Protocol with the ACP countries.
Export subsidies are disbursed in two ways: weekly export tenders and 
standing export refunds. Export tenders are awarded each season. As part 
of the process, traders (and some processors) bid for the minimum level 
of refunds they can accept for exporting sugar, based on what they would 
receive for domestic sales. These tenders apply to most EU sugar exports. 
The standing export refund for sugar is meant to apply to the export of small 
quantities. Set every 2 weeks, the refund equals the lowest tender minus 3 
euros per ton of sugar. Sugar-containing foods, drinks, and other products 
also qualify for export subsidies. These refunds are ﬁ  xed monthly and are 
based on export refunds for white sugar minus 3 euros per 100 kilograms and 
the sugar content of the product.
EU-25 sugar exports, whether subsidized directly or indirectly, averaged about 
6 million tons a year in the late 1990s and early 2000s and accounted for about 
30 percent of total world exports. An EU average of 3.5 million tons of sugar 
(including sugar in processed products) is exported with a direct subsidy. This 
amount far exceeds the 1.273 million tons allowable under WTO commit-
ments. The EU does not report to the WTO the subsidies given to re-exported 
reﬁ  ned sugar from ACP raw sugar imports as part of the required notiﬁ  ca-
tions. However, the recent WTO panel ruling clearly identiﬁ  ed both reﬁ  ned 
sugar exports from imported raw ACP sugar and C-sugar exports as beneﬁ  ting 
from export subsidies, making the EU noncompliant with its WTO obligations 
concerning sugar (World Trade Organization, 2005).
Export subsidies are paid for partly from producer levies (charged on A- and 
B-quota sugar) and partly from the EU budget (for re-exports of white sugar 
from imported raw ACP sugar). Overall, sugar export subsidies accounted for 
75 percent of the total CMO budget for sugar in 2004 (table 4). This includes 
802 million euros for the equivalent of 1.6 million tons of re-exported ACP 
sugar. By comparison, sugar production refunds for the chemical industry are 
194 million euros (11 percent), reﬁ  ning aid for cane sugar totals 41 million 
euros (2 percent), export refunds for value-added food products containing 
sugar total 183 million euros (11 percent), and aid for the disposal of raw 
sugar (overseas department sugar) totals 18 million euros (1 percent).
Preferential Imports
Following the UK accession in 1973, the CMO for sugar incorporated some 
of the UK’s earlier commitments to the ACP countries. This change led to 
the Sugar Protocol, which opened the EU market to a cane-sugar quota from 
19 ACP countries. With the addition of a separate agreement that establishes 
Table 3
EU export refunds, 1996-2006
Item 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005 2006
 Million  euros
Refunds 1,230 1,360 1,370  1,593 1,497 1,008  1,168 1,021 1,285  1,081  1,117
Source: USDA, ERS.11
The EU Sugar Policy Regime and Implications of Reform / ERR-59  
Economic Research Service/USDA
an import quota of 10,000 tons of raw sugar for India, total imports under 
the Sugar Protocol amount to just over 1.3 million tons. These imports are 
exempt from duties, and the price paid to exporters is equal to the derived 
intervention price for raw sugar in the EU.
In addition to imports under the Sugar Protocol, the EU imports sugar under 
preferential terms to meet its so-called Maximum Supply Needs (MSNs), 
based on the capacity needs of ﬁ  ve member states for reﬁ  ning raw cane 
sugar.5 Since 1995, MSNs were established for all member states, and extra 
sugar needs not met by production and imports under the Sugar Protocol are 
met by additional preferential sugar imports from India, the ACP countries, 
and regions within the French Overseas Department (DOM). This additional 
preferential sugar, totaling approximately 200,000 tons, can be imported duty 
free under bilateral agreements known as Special Preferential Sugar (SPS). 
Under the SPS agreements, exporters also receive the EU domestic price for 
raw cane sugar.
Since February 2001, the EU has agreed to offer progressive duty- and 
quota-free access to exports from 48 LDCs as part of the EBA Initiative. 
Access began with 74,185 tons in 2001 and will increase 15 percent annu-
ally until 2009, when free access will be allowed. The EBA Initiative ensures 
an increase in the ﬂ  ow of preferential imports into the EU, especially from 
low-cost countries, such as Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Mozambique, 
as well as the possibility of implementing “SWAP” practices, which enable 
participating LDCs to import sugar from third countries at world prices and 
then export locally produced sugar to the EU. However, some in the EU 
question whether the EBA countries have the capacity to export signiﬁ  cant 
amounts of sugar. Under the EBA Initiative, imports from eligible countries 
also have been counted as part of the SPS quota. EBA-eligible countries from 
the ACP group may choose between the EBA and Sugar Protocol agree-
ments. Under either regime, suppliers receive the EU domestic price for raw 
cane sugar, but EBA countries will face no quota restrictions or duties after 
2009.
In October 2007, the EU agreed to terminate the ACP Sugar Protocol by 
October 2009 to comply with the WTO panel ruling regarding sugar export 
subsidies, which includes the subsidies that went to re-export sugar from 
the ACP countries. The sugar arrangements between the EU and the ACP 
countries will depend on economic partnership agreements (EPA) that are 
negotiated between the EU and individual ACP countries or groups of ACP 
 5 The 1.8 million tons are expressed 
as white sugar and are split among the 
UK (1.0 million tons), France (0.30 
million tons), Portugal (0.30 million 
tons), Finland (0.060 million tons), and 
Slovenia (0.02 million tons).
Table 4
CMO budget for sugar and export subsidy outlays, 2004
 Million  euros  Percent
Total budget for CMO for sugar   1,721  100
Total export subsidies (ES):   1,285  75
ES for ACP sugar  802  47
Refunds for chemical industry  194 11
Reﬁ  ning aid for cane sugar  41  2
ES for non-Annex I products  183  11
Aid for disposal for raw sugar  18  1
Source: USDA, ERS using data from CAP Monitor (2004).12
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countries. The ACP countries will be granted duty-free access on January 
1, 2010, for raw sugar and sugar beets but on the same terms as non-ACP 
developing countries. This development means that the “SWAPS” feature 
of the EBA Initiative, which allows EBA countries to import sugar at world 
prices and then export locally produced sugar to the EU, will not be available 
to the ACP countries that are not party to the EBA Initiative.
The EU also has a preferential import agreement with the Balkan countries, 
which can export within a tariff-rate quota of 193,000 tons to the EU duty 
free. Also, under the Uruguay Round and as a result of the accession of 
Finland, Austria, and Sweden as member states, the EU agreed to a Most 
Favored Nation access quota covering 85,463 tons of raw cane sugar for 
reﬁ  ning, with reduced duties of 98 euros per ton for sugar from Cuba (58,969 
tons) and Brazil (23,930 tons). This sugar does not qualify for a price guar-
antee. And, as mentioned earlier, the EU was obligated to allocate “current 
access” quotas of 490,000 tons to third countries to compensate for exports 
lost due to the accession of 10 Eastern European countries to the EU in 2004.
Import Duties
Import duties ensure that the price of imported sugar does not fall below the 
EU sugar price and that sugar imports from certain countries receive pref-
erential status. It also provides for “special preferential” treatment of sugar 
imports from India and, starting in 2009, from the 48 LDCs as part of the 
EBA Initiative. Outside the preferential duties, border protection is very high 
and consists of two duties: one ﬁ  xed and one variable resulting from the 
application of the special safeguard clause. The ﬁ  xed duty is set at 419 euros 
per ton for white sugar and 339 euros per ton for raw sugar. The variable 
duty under the special safeguard clause is linked to the trigger price set at 531 
euros per ton for white sugar and 418 euros per ton for raw sugar in the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture. The EU can invoke the special safeguard clause 
whenever the world market price falls below the trigger price. Because the 
EU negotiated a high trigger price for sugar in the Uruguay Round, the safe-
guard clause and, hence, the additional duty have been applied consistently 
since 1995.
With the ﬁ  xed duty and the special safeguard, the overall import tariffs on 
average amount to three times the world price. For example, if the world 
price is 250 euros per ton, the special safeguard will be 82.1 euros in addition 
to the ﬁ  xed tariff of 419 euros, which results in a duty-inclusive import price 
of 751.1 euros per ton.6 The high degree of protection from the combined 
ﬁ  xed tariff plus special safeguard has kept nonpreferential imports at the 
minimum level. This effect can be illustrated through two measures. First, 
the EU’s average overall duty was only 115 euros per ton in 2003 (87 euros 
per ton in 2002). Second, average annual imports of pure sugar at full import 
duty (nonpreferential) have been only 28,000 tons, compared with total 
imports of 1.5 million tons and the EU’s annual consumption of 12.7 million 
tons. Thus, nonpreferential imports equal a mere 0.22 percent of consump-
tion and 0.19 percent of the maximum EU sugar production quota.
 6 According to Article 5.5 of the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, given 
the trigger price P, if the import price 
in CIF terms is X and 0.9P >X> 0.60P, 
then the additional safeguard duty is 
(0.9P – X) * 0.3. Other formulas apply 
to other price ranges.13
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Market Implications 
Sugar beet production is regulated by national quotas and a high support 
system, making sugar beets one of the most remunerative crops in the EU. 
At 4.767 euros per 100 kilograms, the basic price for sugar beets is higher 
than the estimated breakeven price, at which point it becomes proﬁ  table to 
switch to alternative crops. Breakeven prices in the EU are estimated to range 
from 2.5 euros per 100 kilograms (Denmark) to 4.4 euros per 100 kilograms 
(Finland) (Commission of the European Communities, 2005). The distribution 
of production via national quotas favors the partitioning of national markets 
and ensures that sugar beets are grown across a wide range of conditions in 
terms of cost efﬁ  ciency, from less efﬁ  cient producers, such as Finland, Italy, 
Spain, and Greece, to more efﬁ  cient producers, such as France (with high beet 
yields), Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands (with efﬁ  cient use of inputs) 
(see ﬁ  g. 1). Even within a particular region, the production quotas limit the 
competitive ability of efﬁ  cient producers and create barriers to their entry to 
the market because sugar beet producers are tied to long-term supply contracts 
with regional sugar processors who hold sugar quota rights.
Supply response varies with price changes and depends on marginal cost. 
High-cost producers, supplying only within the A-quota, will continue to 
produce as long as the quota rent (deﬁ  ned as the difference between the price 
received and the marginal cost of production) is positive. Producers in some 
regions can supply quota (A and B) and out-of quota (C) sugar to the world 
market at world prices. For those producers, reductions in the intervention 
price (and hence the producer price) will cut into the captured quota rents but 
will not affect production under the existing price support regime (Frandsen 
et al., 2003). However, this scenario may not generalize to the overall 
EU supply response, particularly for producers whose marginal cost is on 
average higher than the world sugar price, which implies that a reduction in 
the intervention price would affect the level of EU sugar production and not 
just quota rents (Gohin and Bureau, 2006).
Domestic Market Price
In the EU sugar regime, intervention purchases have been rare. The principal 
mechanisms to manage supply and demand are production quotas, import 
controls, and the disposal of excess supply through subsidized exports. The 
end result of this multilayered support mechanism has been to create a price 
band within which domestic market prices ﬂ  uctuate (ﬁ  g. 3). The availability 
of intervention buying at intervention prices forms the ﬂ  oor, while full duty-
paid prices for nonpreferential third-country imports form the ceiling. Under 
the CMO for sugar, subsidized prices can move over an approximate range 
from 670 euros per ton (which represents the export price plus applicable 
transport costs) to 750 euros per ton (depending on the world market price). 
The domestic EU sugar price has typically been maintained at or around 
three times the prevailing world market price.
Under perfect internal competition and given excess supply, sugar prices 
would be driven down to or near the price-ﬂ  oor level (intervention price plus 
transportation costs). However, prices rarely deviate from the price ceiling 
and are consistently kept far above the intervention price. The Netherlands 14
The EU Sugar Policy Regime and Implications of Reform / ERR-59 
Economic Research Service/USDA
Economic Institute (2000) examined price data on the sugar prices paid by 
industrial buyers in the EU and found that average prices in 1999 were 14 
percent higher than the intervention price plus a storage levy (i.e., 743 euros 
per ton). Moreover, prices were high in both sugar-deﬁ  cit and sugar-surplus 
regions, with no clear correlation between prices and supply balances. While 
investigating the merger between two sugar beet processors in 2001, the EU 
Commission found that the price level within the EU was 10- to 20-percent 
higher than the intervention price (i.e., ranging between 700 and 760 euros per 
ton). The market price for a large number of regions over several years was 
found to vary between 717 and 786 euros per ton, with the EU average at 746 
euros per ton, according to the Swedish Competition Authority (2002) (ﬁ  g. 4).
Figure 3
EU sugar price support system
 Source: USDA, ERS using data from Swinbank (2004).
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Sugar Industry Structure and Competition
Transport costs alone are not enough to account for the difference between 
observed sugar prices and expected prices under internal competition. 
Sweden’s estimated average transportation cost is about 0.438 euros per 100 
kilograms per 100 kilometers (400 kilometers is a typical distance between 
sugar plants in continental Europe), which is low compared with the price of 
approximately 70 euros per 100 kilograms (Swedish Competition Authority, 
2002). An alternative explanation for the gap between market and interven-
tion prices is the lack of competition in the sugar-processing industry and 
tacit collusion among ﬁ  rms.
Tacit collusion is a noncooperative type of collusion that does not involve any 
explicit communication among ﬁ  rms. Tacit collusion involves a restriction 
of output, coordination of prices, or market sharing (i.e., securing some parts 
of the market for certain ﬁ  rms) in which each ﬁ  rm independently or willingly 
engages. Each of these activities leads to an increase in price from which all 
ﬁ  rms beneﬁ  t. Tacit collusion requires repeated interaction among ﬁ  rms, a price 
exceeding marginal cost that can be sustained by using the threat of retaliation 
in response to any attempt at competing to change the present market situa-
tion. If price is the variable that is coordinated, or if markets are shared, it is 
the threat of a future price war that keeps ﬁ  rms at the collusive equilibrium, 
where prices are substantially higher than marginal costs. A deviation from the 
collusive equilibrium is deﬁ  ned as a small unilateral decrease in price by one 
ﬁ  rm. A deviation lasts only as long as it goes unnoticed by other ﬁ  rms in the 
market. However, all ﬁ  rms are deterred from deviating by the threat of a price 
war during a retaliatory period, when all ﬁ  rms price at marginal cost and proﬁ  ts 
are low or zero for all ﬁ  rms. According to the Swedish Competition Authority 
(2002), ﬁ  rms in the EU sugar industry are able to charge higher prices through 
tacit collusion, and, thus, the exercise of collective market power without 
violating EU or national competition regulations.
The key factors necessary for tacit collusion to prevail are industry concentra-
tion, barriers to entry, signiﬁ  cant transparency, and a retaliatory mechanism. 
In the EU-15, sugar processors are highly concentrated (see table 1). In 7 
of 14 sugar-producing member states, only one ﬁ  rm holds the entire sugar 
production quota, while the remaining 7 sugar-producing member states have 
only a few large sugar beet processors. No clear pattern exists with respect to 
market structure that differs substantially across the member states. Even for 
countries with multiple sugar producers, such as France (15), Italy (5), and 
Belgium (3), prices are no lower than in countries with a single producer. The 
CMO for sugar has enhanced the ability of incumbent ﬁ  rms to sustain tacit 
collusion through higher market concentration. With fewer ﬁ  rms, it is easier 
for ﬁ  rms to determine who has deviated in order to retaliate. The CMO for 
sugar has maintained production in regions that otherwise would not culti-
vate sugar beets. By assigning quotas on a national level, the CMO for sugar 
has consolidated the division of national markets. Without the CMO’s quota 
system, it would be possible to decrease concentration on the national level.
In the EU sugar market, new entry of ﬁ  rms is restricted because a production 
quota is necessary, and quotas are allocated only to incumbent ﬁ  rms. The 
tariff structure makes it difﬁ  cult to import sugar from nonpreferential coun-
tries, hence preventing competition from outside the EU. Also, the CMO for 16
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sugar has limited the possible entry of ﬁ  rms producing the sugar substitute 
isoglucose via restrictive production quotas.
Substantial transparency in the market facilitates tacit collusion. In the sugar 
industry, transparency refers to a ﬁ  rm’s ability to detect whether a competing 
ﬁ  rm has deviated by offering better deals to sugar buyers (without knowing 
the price agreed between a supplier and a buyer). The CMO for sugar has 
increased transparency by separating markets geographically and fostering 
market sharing, thereby reducing the number of alternative suppliers.
For tacit collusion to be sustainable, threats of retaliation need to be credible 
(i.e., there must be some effective retaliatory mechanism that yields lower 
proﬁ  ts for all ﬁ  rms in the case of deviation and retaliation). In the EU sugar 
market, subsidized annual exports of A- and B-sugar, which average 2.9 
million tons (compared with domestic sugar consumption of 12.7 million 
tons), provide an opportunity for retaliation by competing ﬁ  rms. As retali-
ation to an observed deviation by a ﬁ  rm, other ﬁ  rms could redirect some of 
their sugar normally intended for exports into the domestic market, hence 
starting a price war by bringing prices down to the marginal cost level (the 
intervention price plus transport cost). Consequently, ﬁ  rms are deterred from 
deviating by the threat of a price war during a retaliatory period, where all 
ﬁ  rms are forced to operate at marginal cost and zero proﬁ  ts. By assigning 
quotas in excess of consumption, the CMO for sugar has in effect provided 
an effective retaliatory mechanism.
World Sugar Markets and Prices
The EU plays a signiﬁ  cant role in the world sugar market, accounting for 12 
percent of world exports and 5 percent of world imports in 2004. On average, 
international sugar trade amounts to roughly 40 million tons, or 30 percent of 
world production. Although the leading sugar-producing countries are also 
the leading consumers, sugar is a widely traded commodity. Among the main 
features of world sugar trade are the differentiation between raw and reﬁ  ned 
sugar, the regional character of trade ﬂ  ows, and the existence of policies and 
subsidies that affect a signiﬁ  cant portion of the sugar trade. 
The differentiated nature of traded sugar derives from its two main sources: 
sugarcane and sugar beets. Cane sugar constitutes about 70 percent of world 
production (30 percent for beet sugar). Sugarcane processing has two stages. 
The ﬁ  rst stage yields semiprocessed (or raw) sugar that can be transported 
and exported. Much of the sugar imported by the EU is in this form. Once 
imported, the raw sugar undergoes a second processing stage to produce a 
white crystal sugar (reﬁ  ned). Sugar beets, on the other hand, are processed 
domestically in a single step into crystal sugar. The EU produces mostly beet 
sugar, processed domestically and supplied to either domestic or international 
markets. The EU also re-exports excess reﬁ  ned sugar derived from imported 
raw cane sugar.
World sugar trade is also characterized by regional patterns (table 5). 
Australia’s sugar exports to the EU-25 in 2000-02 averaged $8 million, a 
small amount of the country’s total sugar exports of $799 million. The main 
raw/reﬁ  ned sugar exporters are Brazil, the EU, Central America, African 
producers, Thailand, and Fiji.17
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Most of the EU’s raw sugar imports come from African, Caribbean, and 
Central American countries and Fiji under the Sugar Protocol (table 6a). 
Brazil exports raw sugar mostly to Russia, North Africa, the Middle East, 
and North America. For reﬁ  ned sugar, the top three exporters are the EU, 
Brazil, and Thailand (table 6b). Most of the EU’s reﬁ  ned sugar exports go to 
Table 5
Bilateral trade ﬂ  ow: All sugar, 2000-02
 Importer
Exporter  EU-25  Japan  U.S.  Russia  N. Afr.  M. East  Other  Total
 $  millions
ACP  661 37  147  325 33 129 4 96 1,828
EU-25 0  27  18  88  327  448  788  1,696
Brazil 11  0  76  299 139 269 477  1,271
Australia  8 126  38  0  14  52  561 799
Thailand  1 121  5  42  0  36  452 657
Colombia  0 0  25  46 3  0  152  226
LDC  95 0  28 0  10  3  85  221
India  26 0  1 0 0  7  142  176
Other 382  131  476  124  65  153  1,334  2,665
Total 1,184  442  814  924 591 1,097 4,487  9,539
Note: LDC=Least developed countries. Totals reﬂ  ect average over 2000-02.
Source: USDA, ERS using data from Dimaranan and MacDougall (2006) (average 2000-02).
Table 6a
Top 20 raw sugar exporters to the world and the EU-15, 2003
  Raw sugar exports
Exporter  To world  Exporter  To EU-15  Share of world
  $ millions  $ millions  Percent
Brazil 1,350  Mauritius  298  99
Thailand 426  CARICOM    153  76
Cuba 364  Fiji 105  88
Mauritius 302  Guyana 90 72
Guatemala 212  Malawi  44  47
CARICOM 201  Cuba  33 9
South Africa  151  Belize  23  63
Guyana 125  Barbados  21  100
Fiji 120  Brazil  19 1
Colombia 107  Trinidad  and  Tobago  13  100
Malawi  92 Aruba  13  100
India 69 Zambia  12  39
Philippines 62  Ethiopia  10  63
El Salvador  47  Sudan  7  84
Belize  36  St. Kitts and Nevis  7  99
Zambia 31  Kenya 6  31
Costa Rica  25  Cote d’Ivoire  6  89
Barbados 21  Nepal  5  95
Kenya 20  Paraguay  3  28
Peru 19 United  States  3  43
Argentina 17  Madagascar  1  99
EU-15   90 EU-15  (intra-trade)  85  94
Note: CARICOM member states include Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.18
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Table 6b
Reﬁ  ned (white) sugar trade, 2003
  Reﬁ  ned sugar exports
Exporter  To world  Exporter  To EU-15
  $ millions  $ millions
EU-15 2836.1  EU-15  1738.7
EC-10 274.2  EC-10  152.1
Brazil 800.4  Pakistan  43.1
Thailand 549.2 United  States  20.0
India 195.6 Egypt  18.4
Belarus 132.4  Cote  d’Ivoire  14.8
Colombia 127.6  Canada  13.1
Canada 126.7  Brazil  10.8
Malaysia  96.7 India  9.8
Pakistan 74.3  Tanzania  8.4
United States  74.0  Sudan  6.5
South Africa  73.6  Switzerland  4.8
South Korea  71.9 Thailand  4.3
Turkey 47.4  Mexico  3.2
Kazakhstan 37.6  South  Africa  3.0
Australia 34.1  Morocco  2.2
Georgia 34.0  Macedonia  2.1
Egypt 33.1  Mauritius  1.9
China 26.7  CARICOM    1.7
Singapore 24.1  Malawi  1.5
  Reﬁ  ned sugar imports
Importer  From world  Importer  From EU-15  Share of world
  $ millions  $ millions  Percent
EU-15 2,355.9 EU-15  (Intra-trade)  1,838.2
EC-10 123.1  EC-10  89.8
United States  234.3  Israel  91.2  98
Syria 150.3  Algeria  90.6 76
Indonesia 150.3  Switzerland  65.2 97
Nigeria 139.0 Norway  53.6  89
Algeria 119.1 Lebanon  40.3  97
Sri Lanka  108.6  Nigeria  39.8 29
Israel  93.0 Syria  38.7  26
Singapore  91.1 Indonesia  33.5  22
Ghana 84.3  Sri  Lanka  30.7  28
Switzerland 67.2  Tunisia  30.0  65
Norway 60.6  Jordan  20.4  41
Mexico 54.0  Armenia  16.4  75
Egypt 50.7  Senegal  13.5  85
Russia 49.9 Croatia  13.1  87
Jordan 49.4 Macedonia  10.7  84
South Korea  48.4  Albania  10.1  66
Chile 46.8  Gambia  9.9 57
Tunisia 46.2  Romania  9.0 30
Source: USDA, ERS using data from COMTRADE.19
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other parts of Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and, to a lesser extent, 
Africa and, much less, Asia. Brazil also exports heavily to the Middle East 
and Africa. However, neither the EU nor Brazil dominates in Asian markets, 
which source most of their sugar needs regionally, notably from Thailand 
and Australia.
Sixty percent of world sugar trade takes place under long-term contracts, 
preferential agreements, and subsidies, while only 40 percent trades at world 
market prices. Within this global sugar situation characterized by residual 
demand, differentiated raw/reﬁ  ned sugar markets, and regional trade patterns, 
the EU plays a signiﬁ  cant role in inﬂ  uencing world prices, particularly for 
white sugar, mostly due to large quantities of subsidy-enabled sugar exports. 
Of the 21.3 million tons of white sugar exported worldwide, the EU exports 
over 6.4 million tons, a large share of which beneﬁ  ts from export subsidies, 
which tend to put downward pressures on prices.
Protectionist policies and subsidies also contribute to the volatility of world 
sugar prices (ﬁ  g. 5). For example, raw sugar prices tripled from 1985 to 1989 
and more than doubled between 2003 and 2006, compared with much lower 
price variations for wheat. Given the high degree of intervention in the sugar 
market, international prices tend to be extremely volatile, following an erratic 
path. Factors accounting for the inherent volatility of the world price of sugar 
include the perennial nature of sugarcane production, the high cost of switching 
to alternative crops, and limited possible options for sugar beet producers 
due to complex capital investments, transport, and processing. Such invest-
ments require stable output even when prices are low, hence, exacerbating 
excess supply. Variations in exchange rates, which may mask world price 
signals, coupled with high levels of government support and trade protection, 
also contribute to world market prices that are sometimes even lower than the 
marginal cost of the most efﬁ  cient producers (OECD, 2005).
Since 1995, world sugar prices have trended downward, mainly due to an 
excess of production over consumption. During the 1990s, monthly world 
prices for raw sugar ﬂ  uctuated between 280 euros per ton (March 1990) 
Figure 5
World sugar and commodity prices
Dollars per ton
Source: USDA, ERS (2006).
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and 110 euros per ton (April 1999). From their low point in 1999/2000, 
prices improved over 2000/01, reaching an average of 240 euros per ton. 
By the following year, prices had declined again to 180 euros per ton. Since 
2003, however, sugar prices have increased, largely driven by high oil 
prices and the sharp increase in ethanol-related sugar demand. The strong 
co-movement between rising crude oil and sugar prices also is tied to the 
close link between ethanol and sugar production in Brazil, the world’s 
largest sugar producer (20 percent of the world’s total) and exporter (38 
percent of the world’s total). Any increase in gasoline prices stimulates 
Brazilian domestic demand for ethanol, reduces sugar exports, and raises 
sugar prices. In the short run, at least, world sugar prices likely will be tied 
to developments in the ethanol market.21
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The 2005 Sugar Reform
The EU Commission issued a draft proposal for sugar reform in July 2004 
that was subsequently revised following the WTO ruling on EU export 
subsidies. A revised reform package was proposed in June 2005, endorsed 
by the Council of Ministers in November 2005, and formalized by the 
EU Parliament (January 19, 2006) and later by the Council of Ministers 
(February 22, 2006). The stated aims of the reform are (1) to encourage 
reductions in domestic sugar output, particularly in regions with high produc-
tion costs or lower sugar beet yields; (2) to bring export subsidies in line with 
WTO commitments; (3) to dampen incentives for EU sugar imports from the 
EBA countries; and (4) to reduce the price gap between sugar and competing 
sweeteners to forestall the substitution of sugar.
The new elements of the new sugar regime, which took effect on July 1, 
2006, include lower price support, a rationalization of the production quota 
system through a voluntary buyout scheme, and compensation for farmers 
paid through the Single Farm Payment (SFP), a ﬁ  xed producer payment 
based on historical aid entitlements, which is a key feature of the new CAP 
regime. The main elements of the reform, summarized in table 7, are as 
follows:
￿ The intervention price for sugar is cut 36 percent (from 631.9 euros to 
404.4 euros per ton) over 4 years, beginning in 2006/07 (minimum sugar 
beet price is reduced 39.5 percent to 263 euros per ton).
￿ In exchange for cuts in support prices, farmers will receive direct 
compensation at an average of 64.2 percent of the price cut. The aid is 
included in the SFP (and, hence, partly decoupled from production) and 
is linked to compliance with a set of environmental and land manage-
ment practices. Farmers in those countries giving up at least 50 percent of 
their quota receive an additional coupled payment (i.e., linked to produc-
tion) of 30 percent of the income loss for a maximum of 5 years, plus 
possible limited national aid. In addition, sugar beets qualify for set-aside 
payments when grown as a nonfood crop (i.e., sugar beets for nonfood 
use may be grown on set-aside area) or may receive the energy crop aid 
of 45 euros per hectare.
￿ The current quota system is rearranged by merging A and B quota into 
a single production quota totaling 17.4 million tons for the EU-25. To 
maintain a certain level of production in the current C-sugar-producing 
countries, an additional amount of 1 million tons will be made available 
as new quota (plus 100,000 tons for other countries) to be purchased 
with a one-off payment of 730 euros per ton. Moreover, a production 
charge of 12 euros per ton is imposed on producers for all quota produc-
tion. Production quotas exclude sugar for chemical, pharmaceutical, and 
ethanol production.  
￿ To encourage the buyout of quotas, a voluntary restructuring scheme is in 
place for 4 years and covers EU sugar factories and isoglucose and inulin 
syrup producers. The scheme involves buying out quota from sugar 
processors and encouraging factory closures. The payment is 730 euros 
per ton in years 1 and 2, falling to 625 euros per ton in year 3 and 520 22
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euros per ton in the ﬁ  nal year. An additional diversiﬁ  cation fund is set 
for member states where quota retirement is larger than expected. Both 
payments will be ﬁ  nanced by a levy on quota holders lasting 3 years. The 
ﬁ  rst-year levy is equal to 126.4 euros per ton; the second-year levy, 173.8 
euros per ton; and the third-year levy, 113.0 euros per ton. The isoglu-
cose levy is ﬁ  xed at 50 percent of these rates. To discourage production 
outside quota (C-sugar), a prohibitive “super levy” is applied to over-
quota production.
￿ Even though the quota release will be handled under a voluntary scheme, 
the production quota for 2006/07 was temporarily cut by 2 million tons, 
or 11 percent, to prevent overproduction.
￿ Supply management tools include both old and new mechanisms. A 
key change is the 4-year phaseout of the intervention system, which is 
replaced with a reference price. Intervention purchases will not be avail-
able after the transition period. Instead, supply management will rely 
mostly on a private storage system when the market price falls below the 
Table 7
Key elements of the EU’s 2005 sugar reform
Item Previous policy regime Policy change under reform
Production quotas National allocation of quotas; 
A and B quota (17.441 MT); 
(industrial sugar excluded)




Solely for exports; subject to 
declassiﬁ  cation/carryover
C-sugar cannot be exported; 
penalty with super levy
Quotas for sugar-
substitute
Isoglucose (500,000 tons), 
inulin (300,000 tons); no 
intervention
Isoglucose quota increase by 
403,000 tons
Intervention price White sugar: 631.9 euros 
per ton; minimum sugar beet 
price 46.72 euros per 100 
kilograms (A); 32.42 euros (B)
Intervention becomes refer-
ence price for triggering pri-
vate storage aid; 36 percent 
cut over 4 yrs
Intervention pur-
chases
In place; rarely used (1987, 
2005)
Phased out in 4 years
Excess supply 
management
Private storage subsidies Private storage/carry forward 
to next year quota
Farm payments None 64 percent of price cut; 
included in Single Farm Pay-
ment (new CAP)
Set-aside None Set-aside + energy use 
subsidies
Export subsidies A+B sugar; re-export pro-
cessed ACP sugar
Reducing export subsidies 
to WTO limits—Via lower 
production; no exports of 
C-sugar
Preferential imports ACP/India “Sugar Protocol”; 
Special Preferential Sugar; 
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reference price. Other available supply management tools include the 
option to carry forward quota overrun to the following marketing year, 
temporary quota withdrawal, or use of excess production for industrial 
products or for supplying the outermost regions of the EU. However, 
no exports of declassiﬁ  ed sugar (C-sugar) are permitted under the new 
regime.
￿ For nonsugar sweeteners, a quota increase for isoglucose of 403,000 tons 
for the existing producer companies is being phased in over 3 years. This 
measure includes the option to purchase extra isoglucose quota in Italy 
(60,000 tons), Sweden (35,000 tons), and Lithuania (8,000 tons) at the 
restructuring aid price set in the ﬁ  rst year at 730 euros per ton.
￿ The border protection regime did not change, aside from reducing 
exports and subsidies to WTO limits and maintaining the existing inter-
national import commitments. Nonpreferential import duties (including 
the special safeguards) are not affected by the new regime. Only a new 
WTO agreement from the current Doha Round of negotiations would 
affect these import policy instruments.
￿ In September 2007 (AgraEurope, 2007), the EU agreed to changes in 
the sugar-restructuring plan to encourage removal of EU sugar quota 
by offering higher buyback payments to beet growers while shielding 
reﬁ  ners from receiving any less than 90 percent of the buyback payment. 
However, growers can apply directly to the Commission for 237.5 euros 
per ton payment as long as the renounced quota does not exceed 10 
percent of the reﬁ  ner’s total quota. Also, factories that give up quota 
in 2008/09 will be reimbursed for the restructuring levy they paid in 
2007/08. By the end of 2007, sugar producers had renounced 1.56 million 
metric tones of quota, more than twice that of the previous year.
What then are the likely impacts of the EU sugar reform on supply, demand, 
and prices in the EU? How are sugar imports from both preferential and 
nonpreferential sources likely to change? And, what are the likely effects on 
world sugar prices, if any, that would arise from the reforms?24
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Reform Assessment
An examination of the current market reveals some indications of the 
potential effects of the EU sugar reforms. While the new regime represents 
a signiﬁ  cant departure from existing policies, many of the support instru-
ments are still in place, which has the potential to limit the extent to which 
the goals of the reform can be achieved. Even with cuts in support prices 
and incentives to renounce quota, sugar crops may still be more attractive to 
growers than the alternatives. Moreover, high import barriers will continue 
to shield the domestic sugar industry. The inability of quota holders to trade 
quotas across member states may restrict the degree of industry adjustment 
toward greater cost efﬁ  ciency. In addition, the new policy continues to limit 
substitutions between sugar and alternative sweeteners, as the new isoglucose 
production quotas are still highly restrictive.
The new provisions of the EU sugar regime are expected to alter the EU 
sugar market. According to EU Commission estimates, restricting EU sugar 
exports to comply with the WTO panel ruling alone will require a reduction 
in EU sugar production of around 2 million tons per year. High-cost regions 
such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Portugal would take the brunt of the reduc-
tion, while low-cost regions could increase production, depending on the 
restructuring component of the proposal. France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and the UK have been the largest producers of over-quota sugar. 
Nonetheless, regions within these countries are likely to see sugar production 
decline because of high production costs and/or inefﬁ  cient processors.
Regarding trade, while the EBA countries are expected to increase sugar 
shipments to the EU after 2009, there is some uncertainty about the expected 
volume of imports from these countries. Because of the “SWAPS” provision 
in the EBA Initiative, EBA countries would be able to import sugar at world 
prices and then export locally produced sugar to the EU. Even with lower 
intervention prices under the reform, some in the EU sugar industry doubt 
that the EBA countries will be able to export raw sugar to the EU proﬁ  tably 
at the lower intervention prices. Under the reform, ACP countries within 
the LDC group (i.e., Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) have the potential 
to offset losses in their current quota exports to the EU by increasing their 
export volumes under the EBA Initiative (Chaplin and Matthews, 2006).
Outside the EBA countries, the reduction of intervention prices will have 
adverse effects on the ACP countries, which enjoy preferential access to the 
EU’s high-priced sugar market. Moreover, any gains by preference-receiving 
countries due to higher exports under higher world prices (due to the EU 
reform) will depend on the proportion of their exports to non-EU countries 
and the extent to which their exports beneﬁ  t from preferential agreements 
with other countries. Among non-LDC ACP countries, the adverse effects 
would be greater for high-cost producers that depend heavily on the EU for 
their sugar exports, such as Mauritius, Fiji, and Guyana. These countries, 
having had secure market access to the EU, lacked the incentives to improve 
their competitiveness, leading to high production cost structures over time 
(Larson and Borrell, 2001).  In October 2007, the EU scrapped the ACP 
Sugar Protocol (AgraEurope, 2008) as a part of the economic partnership 25
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agreements (EPA) that would inter alia reduce tariffs on raw sugar to zero by 
the end of 2009.
The trade implications of the EU reform are ambiguous outside preferential 
trade. On the import side, little change is likely given the unchanged high 
import barriers (outside preferential access). The EU sugar reform, therefore, 
may have a limited effect on competitive sugar suppliers currently excluded 
from the EU market. The implications of the reform may be felt more via 
effects on world prices. A key determinant is the extent of the sugar price 
rise, as the EU withdraws a signiﬁ  cant share of reﬁ  ned sugar exports from the 
world market. Higher prices for reﬁ  ned sugar may adversely affect importing 
regions but may beneﬁ  t competing sugar exporters. Such price effects are 
unlikely to be neutralized by raw sugar exporters, such as Brazil, as it faces 
greater demand for sugar by domestic ethanol producers, further contributing 
to higher world sugar prices.
The reform is expected to alter EU sugar production signiﬁ  cantly. However, 
the key issue of whether domestic sugar prices will follow cuts in interven-
tion prices hinges largely on whether the reforms can weaken the industry’s 
ability to engage in tacit collusion in sugar pricing. The tendency toward the 
consolidation of processors is likely to reinforce market power within the 
industry and strengthen oligopolistic and tacitly collusive behavior. As such, 
market prices may not fall as much as the scheduled reduction of intervention 
prices might imply. A decrease in the intervention price alone would have 
no effect on concentration, transparency and entry into sugar processing, or 
import barriers.
A reduction of export subsidies in compliance with WTO constraints would 
also make collusion easier to sustain. Under this scenario, low-cost ﬁ  rms still 
can export at a proﬁ  t (through lower quantities as proﬁ  ts are reduced from 
lower subsidies), while high-cost ﬁ  rms reduce their output by the amount 
previously exported. Because the majority of the EU’s sugar-producing ﬁ  rms 
are likely to belong to the low-cost category, a reduction in export subsidies 
will have the effect of lowering output (from exiting high-cost ﬁ  rms) and 
may, in fact, increase the incentives for tacit collusion. With lower proﬁ  ts 
from exports, low-cost ﬁ  rms have a greater incentive not to deviate from tacit 
collusion because the proﬁ  t loss under retaliation from domestic sales is now 
proportionally higher (Swedish Competition Authority, 2002).
The effect of a quota reduction on tacit collusion is indeterminate, particu-
larly if the reduction is proportional to all ﬁ  rms. Since it is more proﬁ  table 
for ﬁ  rms to sell sugar to the domestic market than to export, the quota reduc-
tion reduces the amount of sugar available for exports. Hence, both the 
ability to deviate and the ability of competing ﬁ  rms to retaliate (by shifting 
export quantities to domestic sales) are weakened. If the quota reduction 
results in fewer quota holders within the EU, concentration will increase, and 
as a result, tacit collusion may be facilitated.
The effect of quota tradability on tacit collusion depends on the extent of ﬁ  rm 
concentration. If the tradability of quotas among regions (or states) leads to 
increased ﬁ  rm concentration, then the effect on tacit collusion will be indeter-
minate because the increase in collusive proﬁ  ts will counteract the lessened 
ability to divide markets among ﬁ  rms. If, however, quota tradability reduces 26
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concentration through new ﬁ  rm entry, then tacit collusion will be reduced, 
through both the reduction of collusive proﬁ  ts and the lessening of the ability 
to divide markets among ﬁ  rms.
Certain policy changes not included in the new reform could have had the 
effect of weakening the industry’s collusive behavior and, more signiﬁ  cantly, 
altering the economics of EU sugar. For example, lower import tariffs would 
reduce both the incentives for tacit collusion and the market price, and intro-
duction of the ability to trade quotas across member states would make tacit 
collusion harder to sustain. Furthermore, unrestricted production of HFCS 
(isoglucose) would make collusion difﬁ  cult to sustain in markets where 
HFCS is a substitute. However, as these policy instruments are not part of 
the sugar reform, the net effect of the reform on the industry’s competitive 
behavior and producer incentives is unclear. 27
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A Multi-Model Economic Analysis 
A properly speciﬁ  ed quantitative model of the EU sugar regime must reﬂ  ect 
the regime’s key features: production quotas, price support, export subsi-
dies, and import policies, including preferential import agreements. No 
single model can adequately capture all of the subtleties of the EU sugar 
regime. This analysis applied three economic models and focused on their 
distinctive features to provide a richer assessment of the EU sugar reform 
(see box, “Descriptions of the Models”). A partial equilibrium (PE) model 
called the Partial Equilibrium Model of Agricultural Trade (PEATSIM), 
which captures in detail many policy instruments of the EU’s sugar sector 
and the CAP, projected likely changes in EU production, consumption, net 
trade, and prices. A second PE model called the U.S. Sugar and Sweetener 
Model, which allows for substitution between sugar and alternative sweet-
eners, generated detailed analysis of the U.S., Mexican, and EU sweetener 
industries. Finally, a special version of the global computable general equi-
librium (CGE) model created by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
was used to account explicitly for bilateral trade, tariff rate quotas, export 
subsidies, and imperfect competition in the sugar industry. This multimodel 
approach enabled a broader examination of the EU sugar reform than could 
be obtained from any of these models individually.
Partial Equilibrium Analysis 
The PEATSIM model was used to compare the EU sugar “reform scenario” 
with an alternative “status quo scenario” of no reform. Under the reform 
scenario, the intervention price is cut by 36 percent, the production quota is 
cut by 15 percent, and exports are cut by 53 percent to represent the removal 
of C-sugar exports. Under the status quo scenario, the expected impact of 
EBA imports induces lower domestic market prices, resulting in a downward 
adjustment of the producer price by 11 percent. The model baseline under 
both scenarios was run from 2004 to 2009. Results are shown in table 8.
Under the reform scenario, model results show that the combined effect of 
cuts in the intervention price and production quotas will yield a 17.3-percent 
contraction of EU sugar output by 2009 (compared with the status quo 
scenario), while consumption will rise by 7.68 percent over the 5-year period 
(compared with the status quo), or 1.53 percent annually. Consumer prices 
will fall 28.8 percent, compared with the status quo (see table 8, difference 
between third and ﬁ  fth column). Under the reform scenario, the supply-
demand balance will be reversed, with production declining and consump-
tion increasing such that domestic consumption exceeds production. Since 
exports are exogenously cut relative to the base year to reﬂ  ect the removal of 
C-sugar exports, imports will need to expand to 5.1 million tons (compared 
with the status quo), or 113.5 percent, to balance available supplies and 
demand. However, as the model computes only total country trade, these 
imports are not separated between EBA and non-EBA sources.
Results from the U.S. Sugar and Sweetener Model feature a larger production 
response (-34.3 percent by 2010) under the reform scenario, compared with 
that of the status quo case.7 This higher level of output contraction is due to 
the irreversible loss of production capacity once prices fall below variable 
 7 Results from the U.S. Sugar and 
Sweetener Model are taken from Haley 
(2006).28
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PEATSIM
PEATSIM is a PE, multicommodity, multiregion agri-
cultural trade model (Stout and Abler, 2003). With a 
net trade speciﬁ  cation, the model sets a region to be 
either a net importer or a net exporter. In this case, ERS 
treats the EU as a net sugar importer since researchers 
are most interested in import responses to the EU 
sugar reform and since exports are set exogenously to 
be reduced as part of a policy change. Sugar produc-
tion in the model is handled on a raw sugar equivalent 
basis, and since preferential agreements are not explic-
itly addressed, production is adjusted to include pref-
erential imports (from the ACP countries, India, and 
the Balkans). The model speciﬁ  es a support price in 
the form of a reference price treated as an intervention 
price. For the import regime, import tariffs are based 
on two-tier tariffs using the ad valorem equivalent of 
speciﬁ  c tariffs. Under the EU policy reform, sugar farm 
payments equivalent to 64.2 percent of price cuts are 
introduced into the model starting in 2006 and treated as 
decoupled payments. This means that the payments are 
not expected to affect production decisions. Following 
the 2003 CAP reform, set-aside payments are ignored, 
given that their reallocation is linked to all arable crops 
(and not just grains and oilseeds, as was the case before 
the 2003 CAP reform). Therefore, one would expect 
little inﬂ  uence on production patterns.
For supply management, the model is initially set so that 
the quota is equal to beginning production. To model the 
impact of the reforms besides cutting the intervention 
price by 36 percent, the future target production quota 
is set to balance consumption, preferential imports, and 
WTO-permitted exports. For the production quota, a 
phased quota reduction is implemented in the reform 
scenario from 2006 to 2010. The desired quota level 
in 2010 is determined by taking into account the 
EU’s WTO export commitment, preferential imports, 
and domestic consumption. Therefore, in the reform 
scenario, a target production quota cut is induced in 
line with the EU Commission’s decision to cut quotas 
by 15 percent for 2006/07, which aims to achieve the 
supply-demand balance. Moreover, the model scenario 
“restrains” exports by preventing C-sugar from being 
exported, thus implicitly accounting for EU compliance 
with the WTO ruling on export subsidies.
U.S. Sugar and Sweetener Model
The U.S. Sugar and Sweetener Model is a PE model 
with greater detail on sugar and sweetener production, 
supply, and demand (Haley, 2006). The model is spec-
iﬁ  ed for the United States and Mexico and extended 
to the EU, with the rest of the world as a residual. 
The model is initialized to a 2003 base and gener-
ates yearly baseline projections to 2015. The model 
covers sugar, substitute sweeteners (high fructose 
corn syrup or high fructose syrup), and the primary 
sugar crops (cane sugar and sugar beets). Effects of 
policy changes, such as the EU sugar reform, can be 
compared with the model’s baseline.
The EU component of the model includes the interven-
tion/reference price and sugar and isoglucose produc-
tion quotas. Because the model does not permit bilateral 
trade ﬂ   ows, preferential imports (from ACP, EBA, 
and Balkan regions) are treated as a composite, while 
over-quota sugar imports are subject to over-quota 
tariffs. The EU sugar and isoglucose supply response 
to policy changes is modeled via a logistic function 
that determines changes in processing capacity and, 
hence, production. Area planted with sugar beets has 
been stable because EU sugar policies limit the link-
ages between the world price and domestic production 
and given the inelastic response of price changes to 
planted areas and consumption. Policy-induced produc-
tion change is modeled as follows. Based on estimates 
of sugar and isoglucose variable costs, the simulation-
induced drop in producer returns (to or below the vari-
able cost level) leads to an irreversible reduction of 
processing capacity by 50 percent relative to the base 
period. As processing capacity exits, sugar beet area 
devoted to that capacity exits as well.
GTAP
The applied general equilibrium model GTAP (Hertel, 
1997) is a multiregion, multisector global model of 
production and trade that follows the standard theoret-
ical speciﬁ  cations of CGE trade models. This analysis 
uses a special version of GTAP that deals with imper-
fect competition and the oligopolistic behavior of ﬁ  rms 
(Francois, 1998; Elbehri and Hertel, 2006). The model 
distinguishes between the sugar industry and the sugar 
Description of the Models
Continue on page 2929
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costs.8 The analysis assumes that EBA sugar exports to the EU will grow to 
1.5 million tons by 2015, the end of the projection period. However, as the 
model calculates net trade balances, import ﬂ  ows are not separated between 
preferential and nonpreferential sources. Despite an 11.6-percent decrease 
in the price (compared with the status quo case), EU sugar consumption will 
increase modestly (by about 470,000 tons, or about 2.8 percent, over the 
period 2007-10). EU-25 sugar exports fall to insigniﬁ  cant levels by 2010 and 
remain at or below WTO commitment levels through the end of the projec-
tion period. Similar to the PEATSIM results, the U.S. Sugar and Sweetener 
Model results show that imports will increase 91 percent by 2010 to equalize 
prices across the EU-15 and the new member states.
The world sugar price will rise 8 percent by 2009 under the PEATSIM 
reform scenario and 15 percent by 2010 under the U.S. Sugar and Sweetener 
reform scenario. The larger price effect under the latter model arises from 
that model’s much larger decline in production and, particularly, in exports. 
 8 The model speciﬁ  es asymmetric 
production responses to sugar price 
changes. This means that processing 
production capacity reductions are 
irreversible—closed factories do not 
re-open.
beet/sugar cane crop sectors. Given the market structure 
of the sugar industry and its collusive practices, sugar 
processing is modeled under oligopolistic competitive 
behavior with increasing returns to scale. This allows 
the model to separate cases with or without ﬁ  rm entry 
or exit and, hence, enables separate assessments of 
production adjustments at the ﬁ  rm and industry levels.
In this analysis, only the sugar industry is treated as 
oligopolistic with scale economies, while other sectors 
are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Calibration of 
the oligopoly model and scale economies for the sugar 
industry was based on sugar manufacturing data using 
ﬁ  rm-level sugar production and deriving the Herﬁ  ndhal 
index for all EU countries that produce sugar. The 
maximum-derived Herﬁ   ndhal index (estimated for 
Portugal) was also applied to the remaining member 
states that operate a single plant (ﬁ  rm). To calibrate 
the Cournot model, Herﬁ  ndhal indices and the model-
conformable benchmark number of ﬁ  rms were combined 
with the perceived demand elasticity for each sector. 
(For a detailed description of GTAP’s oligopoly speci-
ﬁ  cation, see Elbehri and Hertel, 2006.) The benchmark 
price-cost margins (markups) are derived for the imper-
fectly competitive sectors using GTAP trade shares and 
the model’s elasticities of substitution. These markups 
are consistent with positive proﬁ  ts in the benchmark 
data set. Model implementation also requires the cali-
bration of a cost disadvantage ratio (CDR) reﬂ  ecting 
unexploited economies of scale. The CDRs for the EU 
were taken from Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1994). 
Data for non-EU regions are reported by Roland-
Holst, Reinert, and Shiells (1994). The scaled ratios are 
reported in table 4 and range from 0.016 for the EU to 
0.001 for non-EU regions.
Sugar production in the EU is also constrained by quota 
limits. The sugar production quota is modeled under a 
complementarity condition allowing for endogenous 
regime change from binding to nonbinding with associ-
ated quota rents (under binding quotas) expressed as a 
tax equivalent. The model does not separate between 
quota (A and B) and nonquota (C) sugar. Rather, the 
model takes into consideration the share of C-sugar in 
total sugar production in setting the initial degree of 
quota binding status. Except for Italy, all 13 EU regions 
start from a binding quota position.
Sugar is treated on a raw sugar equivalent basis, and the 
sugar import regime is modeled as a system of bilater-
ally allocated import quotas following the Armington 
speciﬁ  cation. The model includes 28 regions, 14 of 
which are EU regions (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, 
Sweden, the UK, Hungary, Czech Republic, other EU) 
and 14 non-EU regions (United States, Canada, Mexico, 
Brazil, China, India, Australia, Thailand, ACP, LDC, 
Mediterranean, Central America, other Asia, and rest 
of world). Preferential imports are treated via bilateral 
tariff-rate quotas for a speciﬁ  c set of partners (ACP, 
India). Moreover, these preferential exporters are 
assumed to capture the quota rents to mimic the fact 
that these countries receive guaranteed prices equiva-
lent to domestic prices.
Continue from page 2830
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The signiﬁ  cant drop in exports will reduce the supplies available on the 
world market. These responses are broadly comparable with those reported in 
other studies that use PE models, as shown in table 9. For example, Andino, 
Taylor, and Koo (2005) found that the combination of a 33-percent cut in the 
intervention price and a 15-percent cut in the production quota for EU sugar 
boosted the world sugar price by 14.5 percent.
Still, these magnitudes of world price increases from a unilateral EU sugar 
reform need to be viewed as upper-bound limits for several reasons: the 
price-inelastic nature of sugar markets on both the supply and demand sides; 
the simplifying assumption, typical of PE models, that sugar is a homoge-
neous good and of the same quality across suppliers and countries; and the 
likelihood that world price hikes will be short-term adjustments because 
higher prices will trigger incentives to increase sugar production, which in 
turn will place downward pressure on the world price. Moreover, additional 
dynamic effects that arise from new investments in sugar processing, along 
with industry rationalization and consolidation, contribute to enhanced cost 
efﬁ  ciency and hence affect cost-price relationships.
Table 8
Comparing EU reform to status quo: EU production, consumption, 
trade, and trade effects
 Base  Reform  Change  Status  quo  Change
Item  year*  scenario  from base  scenario  from base
  PEATSIM results (2009)
  Million tons   Percent  Million tons  Percent
Production 20.6  17.0  -17.3  20.6 0.0
Consumption 18.4 20.0  8.9 18.6  1.2
Exports 4.4  2.0  -53.1  4.3  -1.5
Imports 2.4  5.1  113.5  2.4  -0.7
  Dollars per kg    Dollars per kg
Producer price  0.6  0.4  -39.2 0.6  -10.6
Consumer price  0.6  0.4  -39.3 0.6  -10.5
Export price  0.6  0.4  -39.3 0.6  -10.5
Import price  0.6  0.4  -39.3 0.6  -10.5
World price  0.2  0.2  8.0  0.2  -1.5
  U.S. Sugar and Sweetener Model results (2010)
  Million tons   Percent  Million tons  Percent
Production 22.2  14.6  -34.3  21.6  -2.7
Consumption 16.1 16.7  3.7  16.2  0.9
Isoglucose 
  consumption 0.6  0.7  7.8  0.5 -24.9
Exports 6.0  0.2  -97.0 8.1  36.4
Imports 2.1  4.0  91.9 2.9 37.1
  Dollars per kg    Dollars per kg
Producer price  0.7  0.4  -37.7  0.5  -26.1
World price  0.2  0.2  15.0  0.2  -15.0
* Base period is 2004 for PEATSIM and 2003 for the U.S. Sugar and Sweetener Model. 
Source: USDA, ERS.31
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General Equilibrium Analysis
Key differences exist between PE models and CGE models. In a CGE model, 
there is explicit recognition of ﬁ  nite resources in markets for land, labor, 
and capital. In doing so, there is an opportunity cost associated with a farm 
subsidy, where subsidizing one sector comes at the expense of other sectors 
because of competition for ﬁ  xed resources. The PE approach introduces 
upward-sloping supply schedules to acknowledge higher costs as output 
expands. Another major difference is that in a PE model there is no link 
Table 9
Recent studies on EU sugar reform




(PE); 56 regions; raw/
white sugar, beet/
cane sugar
Evaluation of reform and 
the EBA initiative on 
world markets
(1) Baseline 2003-13; 
(2) reform = 39% IP cut
5% rise in world price; 
lower revenue for ACP 
countries despite export 
rise; EBA exports rise 
threefold
El-Obeid and Beghin 
(2005)
CARD Sugar Model 
(PE); 29 regions; 
sugar (raw equiva-
lent); beet/cane sugar
Removal of production 
and trade distortions for 
sugar for all countries 
(supply and consump-
tion are price inelastic)
(1) Free trade (FT); 
(2) = (1) + removal of 
production subsidies; 
(3) = (2) + consumer 
distortions
FT leads to 27% higher 
WP; FT + no domestic 
distortions lead to 48% 
WP rise by 2012; mod-
erate rise in aggregate 
trade
Andino, Taylor, and 
Koo (2005)
World sugar model 
(PE); 17 regions; 
sugar (raw equivalent)
EU sugar reform (cut in 
IP and PQ) and Doha 
Development Agenda 
(DDA) effect on U.S. 
sugar
(1) Baseline; 
(2) partial EU reform (IP 
cut; PQ cut);  
(3) 4 country reform 
under DDA:
(4) EU reform plus 20% 
tariff cut; 
(5) 20% import quota 
rise for China
EU reform increases 
world price; no U.S. ef-
fect; WP rises by 14.5%; 
under DDA, reform WP 
rises by 39%
Gohin and Bureau 
(2006)
Static single-region 
CGE model for food 
and agriculture for EU; 
18 crops, 28 livestock 
commodities
In-quota and over-quota 
beet and sugar are 
distinct products; sugar 
is homogenenous; quota 
rents to exporters
(1) Baseline;
(2) July 2004 EU reform 
+ removal of export 
subsidies
Production falls by 10%; 
C-Sugar eliminated; 
beet prices fall (59%) 
more than sugar; little 
sugar-isoglucose substi-
tution; removal of export 
subsidies means no 
imports of MFN-access 
and GSP but ACP coun-
tries not affected
Van Berkum, Roza, 
and Tongeren (2005)
GTAP-derived model 
(CGE); 12 regions; 7 
commodities
Revised land allocation; 
labor and capital seg-
mented between agri-
cultural and nonagricul-
tural sectors; production 
quota; bilateral TRQs; 
sugar processing under 
imperfect competition; 
matching drop in market 
price with cut in export 
subsidies
(1) EBA Initiative; 
(2) EBA + July 2004 
reform (beet quota cut 
by 16% (from 17.4 to 
14.6 tons); compensa-
tion payments (transfer 
to sugar output; beet 
value added); cut in IP 
by 33%
Little increase in EBA 
imports (384,000 tons 
less than 2.8 million 
tons by European Com-
munity); mild growth of 
exports by ACP; modest 
gains for Brazil; 37% 
drop in exports
Notes: PE = partial equilibrium; CGE = computable general equilibrium; WP = world price; IP = intervention price; PQ = production quota; 
TRQ = tariff-rate quota.
Source: USDA, ERS.32
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between sources and uses of income, which means there is no explicit budget 
constraint for the household that is tied to returns to factors. In a CGE model, 
it is possible to track transfers to the household for a given subsidy. Thus, the 
CGE approach can provide a different perspective for welfare implications 
of policy reform. In addition to these general differences, the GTAP Model 
offers speciﬁ  c treatment for bilateral trade between all partners. This allows 
for analysis of preferential and bilateral free trade reforms. 
A set of scenarios was constructed to illustrate the likely impacts of different 
reform approaches for the EU sugar program.9 The ﬁ  rst scenario (table 10) 
implements the EBA Initiative, whereby the EU removes tariffs and quota 
restrictions on all imports from LDCs. The second scenario, Reform1, imple-
ments the EU reform package of November 2005, in which domestic prices 
are allowed to fall below an existing administered sugar price as a result 
of cuts in border measures for EU sugar exports and imports. The export 
subsidy rate is cut by 20 percent to bring subsidized exports within WTO 
limits. Scenario Reform1Q implements these changes plus the 15-percent 
production quota cut. This scenario is closest to the reform scenarios in 
the PEATSIM and U.S. Sugar and Sweetener Models. Finally, scenario 
Reform1QE reruns Reform1Q by allowing for imperfect competition in 
the domestic sugar industry. EU sugar processors operate with fewer ﬁ  rms 
having market power, hence enabling a separate assessment of ﬁ  rm-level 
versus industrywide adjustments to the EU reforms. All the scenarios were 
modeled to generate medium-term static effects assuming exogenous total 
ﬁ  xed supply of land, labor, and capital, but with factors mobile across 
sectors. Hence, any changes in sugar production came strictly from the real-
location of existing land within agriculture.
Impacts of the EBA Initiative—Implementation of the EBA Initiative 
(scenario EBA) will result in a rise of LDC sugar exports to the EU of about 
$404 million (473 percent), compared with the base. However, as the initial 
level of this trade was small to begin with ($88 million), the effects on EU 
sugar production will be minor (a decrease of less than 1 percent, compared 
with base). Under this scenario, the impact on third countries also will be 
small as the trade restrictions against non-EBA partners are unchanged. 
 9 An updating procedure was applied 
to the initial GTAP database (version 
6.5) to change the base year from 2001 
to 2004 using actual GDP and popula-




GTAP Model scenarios Policy change Sugar market assumption Starting database
EBA Elimination of tariffs from LDCs 2005, EU-25 enlargement
EBA-S Same as EBA High product differentiation
EBA-B Same as EBA Low product differentiation
Reform1 Export subsidy rate cut by 20 percent
Import tariff cut by 36 percent
Intervention ﬂ  oor price allowed to fall
Perfectly competitive industry 2005, post-EBA
Reform1Q Reform1, plus production quota cut by 
15 percent
Perfectly competitive industry
Reform1QE Same as Reform1Q Imperfect competition 
Note: Export subsidy rates in GTAP are derived based on the total value of exports and the total value of subsidy outlays as reported 
to the WTO for the same period; for the EU, this is adjusted to take into account subsidies for ACP sugar not reported to the WTO. Product dif-
ferentiation assumption is governed by trade elasticities
Source: USDA, ERS.33
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Some trade will divert from non-LDC ACP countries to the beneﬁ  t of the 
LDCs, and countries restricted from exporting to the EU, such as Brazil, will 
manage to channel some additional sugar exports to the EU via the LDCs 
(table 11).
Since this analysis does not account for the possibility of additional produc-
tion by the LDCs in response to the EBA Initiative, which was a motivating 
factor behind the reform initiative, some uncertainty exists as to the expected 
new ﬂ  ow of sugar from the LDCs to the EU. A sensitivity analysis helped 
address this uncertainty, focusing on a key variable affecting the respon-
siveness of export demand to policy change. This sensitivity analysis varies 
the Armington trade elasticity of substitution, which reﬂ  ects the degree of 
production differentiation in sugar trade. The EBA scenario was rerun using 
Table 11













EU-25 1,662.7 1,299.1 13.1 40.1 70.0 33.0 61.2 146.2
ACP 2,337.1 924.0 155.9 67.8 62.5 175.8 210.5 740.6
LDC 217.7 88.4 5.1 84.3 8.5 22.2 2.7 6.5
Brazil 1,723.9 29.2 13.7 95.3 313.5 74.6 109.9 1,087.8
C. America 944.2 31.9 41.99 .3 9.7 239.7 119.2 492.5
India 241.5 43.4 0.3 28.6 8.9 2.7 37.2 120.5
Australia 852.2 0.7 3.1 0.0 32.2 51.1 535.6 229.5
Thailand 625.7 5.2 0.3 33.6 0.3 13.7 432.0 140.6
Others 1,537.6 435.2 23.6 25.9 63.9 337.6 272.6 378.9
World 10,142.6 1,557.0












EU-25 3.7 -22.2 0.9 4.6 5.7 1.4 3.6 9.5
ACP -96.2 -100.3 -0.2 2.3 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.9
LDC 402.7 404.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -0.1 -0.2
Brazil -3.2 -3.8 -0.1 2.9 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -1.9
C. America -3.8 -3.3 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.6
India -2.0 -2.5 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.3
Australia -1.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.3
Thailand 0.0 -0.4 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.2
Others -36.7 -36.8 -0.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
World 263.4 257.0
—Continued34
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a range of trade elasticity values from low (greater product differentiation) 
to high (greater homogeneity for sugar among regions).10 The quantitative 
results did not change qualitatively except for the magnitude. The increase in 
EBA sugar exports to the EU will range from 321 percent (highly differenti-
ated case) to 485 percent (homogenous case), compared with a 473-percent 
increase in the central case.11 Translated into quantity terms and using 2001 
prices, the value changes in EBA sugar exports to the EU will range from 
0.50 to 0.75 million tons. These results suggest that while the LDCs may 
signiﬁ  cantly boost their exports to the EU, the volume of new sugar exports 
may still fall short of the EU Commission’s optimistic projections of 2.8 to 
3.5 million tons of imports from the EBA countries by 2014 (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2005).
 10This analysis uses the value of 5.4, 
following recent econometric work by 
Hertel et al. (2003) on trade elasticities.
 11Van Berkum, Roza, and Tongeren 
(2005) also applied a CGE model to ex-
amine the impact of the EBA Initiative. 
They found that LDC exports to the 
EU increase by 384,000 tons, but that 
quantity rises to 900,000 tons under a 
more homogeneous assumption.
Table 11
GTAP model results: EU reform and changes in bilateral trade ﬂ  ows—Continued












EU-25 -129.4 -34.4 -4.6 37.3 -24.6 -16.3 -28.3 -58.4
ACP 363.5 368.2 0.9 -1.2 -0.4 -1.3 -0.1 -2.6
LDC -45.8 -45.6 0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Brazil 36.7 31.1 0.2 -1.0 0.6 0.0 0.8 5.0
C. America 22.8 18.5 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.2 1.0 2.5
India 8.7 8.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6
Australia 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 4.4 1.0
Thailand 4.8 3.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.2
Others -30.7 -34.6 0.3 -0.3 0.1 0.4 2.0 1.3
World 236.3 314.5












EU-25 58.4 283.8 -7.9 -1.6 -45.2 -23.4 -44.2 -103.2
ACP 770.4 779.1 2.0 -1.5 -0.8 -3.0 -1.4 -4.0
LDC 9.3 8.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Brazil 59.8 38.9 0.5 -0.2 2.2 0.2 1.5 16.7
C. America 47.2 36.6 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.7 1.7 6.7
India 65.8 64.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.4
Australia 11.9 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 8.0 2.5
Thailand 11.6 8.6 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 2.9 0.4
Others 363.5 354.2 0.8 0.0 0.5 0.9 3.7 3.4
World 1,397.8 1,575.0
Note: ACP = Africa, Caribbean, and Paciﬁ  c countries. LDC = Least developed countries.
Source: USDA, ERS model simulation results.35
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EU Sugar Reform: Industry Impacts
Under scenario Reform1 (domestic price cut without a production quota 
cut), the reform’s impact on total EU sugar production will be relatively 
small (a decrease of 3.2 percent, table 12). In the presence of binding 
production quotas, sugar production will decrease only in France, Italy, and 
the smaller producing regions. Also, the EU market price for sugar will drop 
9.2 percent in response to the reform. These output and price effects are 
smaller than the PE modeling results due to the general equilibrium feed-
back arising from the simultaneous effects of lower output (lower prices), 
higher imports (to meet higher demand due to lower prices), and reduced 
exports (through cuts in subsidies).
Also in scenario Reform1, the decrease in the producer price (2.3 percent) 
will be smaller than the decrease in the market price (9.2 percent). This 
difference can be gleaned from the relationship linking producers to the 
market price via “tax” or “subsidy” wedges. Such wedges arise from (a) 
the sugar production quota, which, when binding, generates quota rents 
captured by the ﬁ  rm as a subsidy; and (b) the oligopolistic structure of the 
sugar industry, where price markups or excess proﬁ  ts are taxed away from 
the ﬁ  rm. In this scenario, the decrease in the producer price will be smaller 
than the decrease in the market price due to an increase in the tax equiva-
lent of the production quota rent as quotas become more binding. When the 
reform is accompanied by a cut in production quotas (scenario Reform1Q), 
EU sugar output will contract by 14.3 percent (table 12), which is very close 
to the quota reduction of 15 percent. In this case, the market price of sugar 
will rise 22.5 percent, as supply is reduced. However, the producer price still 
contracts only by 2.3 percent due to the combined effect of the drop in quota 
rents (captured as a subsidy for the ﬁ  rm) and increased oligopoly markets 
(captured as a tax for the ﬁ  rm).
When the entry and exit of ﬁ  rms are permitted (scenario Reform1QE), the 
efﬁ  ciency of the industry improves. In this scenario, the number of ﬁ  rms 
exiting the industry ranges from 13 to 17 percent across the 13 EU regions 
represented in the model—except for Italy, whose initial sugar output is 
below quota (table 13). For the remaining ﬁ  rms in the industry, sugar output 
will increase in eight regions and decrease in four, dampening the reduction 
in total output. The overall market price effect (not shown in tables) will 
be slightly larger (23.7 percent) than that of the no entry/exit case (scenario 
Reform 1Q). In addition, the producer price change will become slightly 
positive (2.9 percent) as markups over marginal cost will fall by less under 
free entry and exit.  
On the demand side, the price changes resulting from the reform will lead to 
a small increase (1.1 percent) in EU sugar consumption under Reform1 and 
no change in consumption under Reform1Q, as the EU’s demand for sugar 
is very inelastic. However, in the CGE analysis, the substitution between 
sugar and isoglucose is not directly modeled because the possibilities for 
substituting sweeteners for sugar remain limited in the EU. Unlike in the 
United States, where the soft drink industry relies heavily on HFCS, the EU 
soft drink industry uses mainly saccharose and very little isoglucose, hence, 
limiting potential substitutions with sugar. A separate general equilibrium 
study of the EU sugar reform that used a model to estimate sugar-isoglucose 36
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Table 12
Summary of simulation results
 Initial  base  EBA  Reform1  Reform1Q
Item  % change  Value change1  % change  Value change  % change  Value change
  Million dollars  Million dollars  Million dollars  Million dollars
Imports into EU-25
Total (Extra-EU)  1,363.8 5.7  273.8  19.6 361.2  62.4  1,170.3
ACP  924.0 -10.9 -100.3  45.7  368.2  92.5 779.1
LDC   88.4  473.1  404.0  -8.4  -45.6  1.6  8.8
Mediterranean 197.4 -8.7  -17.4  9.0  9.0 120.8  201.0
United States  56.4  -7.8  -4.5  -11.8  -6.8  113.6  56.4
Canada   18.7  -6.9 -1.3  -35.8  -6.4  60.8  11.0
Brazil 29.2 -12.6  -3.8  123.7  31.1  155.8  38.9
China 0.7  -8.6  -0.1  77.9 0.5 231.3  1.5
India 43.4  -5.5  -2.5  29.8 8.1 158.1  64.2
Australia 0.7  -7.9 -0.1  11.2  0.0  143.8  0.9
Thailand 5.2  -7.8  -0.4  89.7 3.0 224.8  8.6
Exports from EU-25
Total (Extra-EU)  183.2 7.1  14.6  -25.7  -19.6  -60.1 -97.0
ACP 13.1  7.0  0.9 -34.4  -4.6  -58.2  -7.9
LDC   40.1  11.5  4.6  83.2  37.3  -6.4  -1.6
Mediterranean 70.0  8.2  5.7  -33.7  -24.6  -61.6  -45.2
United States  33.0  4.3  1.4  -48.1  -16.3  -70.1  -23.4
Canada   5.1  7.7  0.4  -37.5  -2.0  -70.2  -3.8
Brazil 3.3  5.3  0.2  -46.0  -1.6  -76.2  -2.6
China 3.6  8.3  0.3  -39.4 -1.5  -67.5  -2.6
India 4.5  4.9 0.2  -26.4  -1.3  -48.8  -2.2
Australia 5.2  8.3  0.4  -41.1  -2.2  -70.4  -3.8
Thailand 5.4  6.9 0.4  -46.8  -2.7  -71.5  -4.1
Output (raw sugar equivalent)
EU-25  26,164.0 -1.0  -251.5  -3.2 -791.0  -14.3  -3,653.3
CP 3,981.6 -2.5  -98.8  9.6 374.0  20.4  792.6
LDC 5,322.2  7.6  403.2  -1.3  -73.0  0.3  14.4
Mediterranean 16,358.7  -0.1  -23.1  0.2  32.5  1.7 269.2
United States  32,477.9 0.0  -8.6  0.0  12.5  0.4 121.5
Canada   331.4  -0.5  -1.5  -1.9 -6.3  4.2  13.8
Brazil 5,800.6  -0.1  -4.1  0.8  45.1  1.3  74.4
China 412.7  -0.1  -0.3  0.4  1.7  1.0  4.2
India 7,171.9 0.0  -2.5  0.1  9.7 1.0  68.1
Australia 2,196.4 -0.1  -1.9 0.5 9.8 0.9 20.2
Thailand 1,527.6  0.0  -0.3  0.5  7.1  1.0  15.7
Income (millions of 2001 USD)
EU-25  8,988,151.1   -317.2    1,302.0    1,600.7
ACP 385,024.0    -21.0    -19.1   79.9
LDC 344,329.3   362.9   -14.5    -8.3
Mediterranean 1,178,657.0    3.5    4.1    24.3
United States  11,057,000.0    -39.6   -13.7    48.4
Canada   780,615.4    4.2    -2.3    7.4
Brazil 595,336.6   1.8    2.4    27.0
China 1,384,773.0    -6.2    -2.3    -4.1
India 567,009.9   -12.6    -1.7    10.4
Australia 400,031.3    5.8   -2.4    9.8
Thailand 142,727.5    0.4   -2.4    5.5
Rest of world  1,310,200.1    7.7    -3.5    -11.4
Sugar quota rent 
  —transfer by EU-25  1,151.4    135.1    -478.6    -455.7
Note: ACP = Africa, Caribbean, and Paciﬁ  c countries. LDC = Least developed countries.
1Value change is expressed in constant 2001 U.S. dollars.
Source: USDA, ERS model simulation results.37
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substitution (Gohin and Bureau, 2006) found little increase in consumption 
from cuts in sugar prices.
These scenarios suggest that signiﬁ  cant cuts in EU sugar output may not be 
realized solely through price support cuts, given the oligopolistic nature of 
the EU sugar industry. In 2006 and 2007, a signiﬁ  cant restructuring of the 
industry took place, with both plant closures and quota reallocation between 
plants and countries. At least 7 factories closed in Germany; the number 
of plants in Italy is expected to decline from 19 to 6; all of Ireland’s facto-
ries have closed; and production in Austria, Denmark, and Belgium is now 
concentrated in only 2 plants each (Bureau et al., 2007). However, the net 
decline in quota production resulting from this rationalization was just over 
1 million tons, or 5.4 percent of the total production quota in 2005. Thus, a 
mandatory cut in production quotas may be unavoidable if the EU is to stay 
within its lowered sugar production targets. This is, in fact, what happened, 
as the EU Commission reduced production quotas in 2006 and 2007. In May 
Table 13
EU reforms and market structure for EU sugar industry (GTAP Model results)
  Change  Change in   Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in 
  in number   output per  markups  industry  industry   exports  imports  regional 
  of ﬁ  rms  ﬁ  rm     output  output       income 
  ———————— Percent ————————  ——————— Million dollars ———————
  Reform1Q scenario (no ﬁ  rm entry or exit)
Belgium 0  -15.00  4.51  -15.00  -227  -27  159 83
Denmark 0  -15.00  5.00  -15.00  -58  -4  106  5
Germany 0  -15.00  1.39 -15.00  -771  -32  1,534  -55
Spain 0  -15.00  4.83  -15.00  -145  -17  223  32
France 0  -15.00  -0.82  -15.00  -488  -48  863  305
Italy 0  -2.10  0.02  -2.10  -28  -31  67  53
Netherlands 0  -15.00  1.91 -15.00  -109 -21  114  37
Austria 0  -15.00  5.00  -15.00  -67  -3  135  13
Poland 0  -15.00  4.60  -15.00  -863  -7  7,398 -183
Sweden 0  -15.00  4.59 -15.00  -88  -6  139 -5
United Kingdom  0  -15.00  5.03  -15.00  -509 -13  366  885
Hungary 0  -15.00  4.77  -15.00  -45  -1  68  1
Czech Republic  0  -15.00  4.54  -15.00  -133  -1  205  -29
Other EU   0  -14.65  5.34  -14.65  -320  -18  460  459
  Reform1QE scenario (with free ﬁ  rm entry or exit)
Belgium -15.42  0.50  0  -15.00  -229 -27  199 20
Denmark -15.15  0.18  0  -15.00  -58  -4  108  -10
Germany -13.64  -1.57  0  -15.00  -772  -32  1,550  -118
Spain -15.05  0.06  0  -15.00  -145  -17  224  -8
France -17.33  2.81  0  -15.00  -489 -48  869 325
Italy -0.11  -1.86  0  -1.96 -26  -31  67  51
Netherlands -16.13  1.35  0  -15.00  -109 -21  116  26
Austria -15.15  0.18  0  -15.00  -67  -3  136  -7
Poland -16.11  1.32  0  -15.00  -890 -6  10,064  -289
Sweden -14.88  -0.14  0  -15.00  -89 -6  145  -25
United Kingdom  -14.96 -0.04  0  -15.00  -512  -11  413  727
Hungary -15.08  0.09 0  -15.00  -45  -1  72  -10
Czech Republic  -14.71  -0.34  0  -15.00  -134  -1  216  -55
Other EU   -14.18  -0.34  0  -14.48  -317  -18  472  344
Source: USDA, ERS model simulation results.38
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2007, the Commission decided to withdraw about 2 million tons, or 10.8 
percent of total sugar quota allocations for the EU, leaving only 16.6 million 
tons for 2007/08.
Trade and Income Impacts
The model results indicate that cuts in the domestic price of sugar and sugar 
production quotas will lead to much larger adjustments in production and 
trade than a price cut alone. Under scenario Reform1 (price cut only), EU 
sugar exports will drop by 25.8 percent, the change in EU sugar production 
will decrease by 2.3 percent, and EU sugar imports will increase by 19.6 
percent (see table 12). In contrast, under scenario Reform1Q (price and quota 
cut), the changes in exports, production, and imports are all far more substan-
tial: exports will decrease by 60.1 percent, production contracts will decrease 
by 14.5 percent, and imports will increase by 62.3 percent. Consequently, 
the volume of world sugar trade increases by only 2.5 percent under scenario 
Reform1, compared with 14.5 percent under scenario Reform1Q.
The impact of the EU reform on world prices will be small, ranging from a 
slight drop (0.85 percent) under scenario Reform1 to an increase of about 
1 percent under scenario Reform1Q. The small decrease in the world price 
under Reform1 is due to the lower price of EU sugar imports and lower 
export prices as the EU cuts export subsidies. When EU price changes are 
weighed against the modest price changes in other countries, the net result 
will be a small overall change in the world price index. Under scenario 
Reform1Q, the change in the world price will be slightly positive, as the 
large gains in EU sugar imports boost the beneﬁ  t of exporting. The net 
result will be a slight rise in the world price due to the reduction of EU 
sugar exports.
The rise in EU sugar imports will beneﬁ  t primarily the ACP countries, which 
will expand their exports beyond the quotas of the former Sugar Protocol. 
Because the reform scenario already assumes that EBA-eligible LDCs have 
duty- and quota-free access to the EU market, implementation of the reform 
will add no new beneﬁ  t to these countries. On the contrary, the EBA-eligible 
LDCs will face greater competition from non-LDC suppliers among the 
ACP countries. For the non-EBA and non-ACP sugar suppliers to the world 
market, exports will grow only modestly as world price changes will not 
be large enough to affect the world demand for sugar. Brazil and Central 
America will beneﬁ  t some, but Australia and Thailand, which export sugar 
mostly to Asian countries, will see minimal changes. 
Welfare and income effects for the LDCs under the EBA Initiative (without 
the EU sugar reform) show that income gains will come largely from tariff 
removal on nonsugar exports because initial sugar exports to the EU are 
relatively small, compared with those of other commodities. The EU will 
see a small welfare loss under the EBA Initiative, due mostly to lost tariff 
revenues. Under the reform scenarios, however, the EU’s welfare change 
is positive due to the interplay of several factors: lower sugar prices and 
production costs for sugar-using industries; beneﬁ  ts to consumers through 
cheaper imports; contraction of the sugar industry leading to smaller dead-
weight losses; and lower export subsidies.39
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For preferential partners, the LDCs will show no additional beneﬁ  t from 
the reforms (in the post-EBA environment), while the change in welfare in 
non-LDC ACP countries will depend on the extent of the EU sugar industry’s 
increase in efﬁ  ciency. Under modest contraction of sugar output in the EU 
(scenario Reform1), the welfare change for the ACP countries will be nega-
tive despite increased exports. This effect arises due to lower border-cum-
domestic prices in the EU. These prices translate to quota rent losses, which 
dominate the welfare change. By contrast, under sufﬁ  cient EU sugar produc-
tion cuts, the trade creation for the ACP countries arising from larger sugar 
exports will outweigh the quota rent losses, resulting in a net welfare gain 
for the ACP countries. For nonpreferential exporters that manage to increase 
their exports under scenario Reform1Q, income will rise but only slightly.
Finally, given the complexity of the EU sugar regime, it is important to 
note some caveats inherent in the model assumptions. First, given the long-
standing interventionist nature of EU sugar policies, it is not easy to calibrate 
the proper supply response for EU sugar. This difﬁ  culty arises in all quantita-
tive models that deal with EU sugar (Bureau et al., 2007). Second, the model 
does not include dynamics such as capital accumulation that would mimic 
future investments in sugar processing in third countries beneﬁ  ting from 
the EBA Initiative.  Such investments are likely to push EU sugar imports 
beyond the levels reported in this study’s comparative static analysis. Finally, 
the model does not explicitly address several elements of the reform, such as 
farm payments and payments for quota buyout. Inclusion of these elements 
would have rendered the analysis excessively complicated and difﬁ  cult to 
interpret. Despite these caveats, many critical features of the previous EU 
sugar regime and the reform were incorporated, and the model results seem 
both intuitive and defensible.40
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Conclusions
The 2005 EU sugar reform, the ﬁ  rst in nearly 40 years, has important impli-
cations for EU and international sugar markets. The reform is an effort to 
mitigate the expected increase in domestic imbalances in supply and demand 
arising from larger sugar imports and greater constraints on exports. Several 
developments are interpreted as signs of this expected imbalance: (1) the 
likely rise in sugar imports from least developed countries following the 
implementation of the EBA Initiative, (2) the issuance of new access quotas 
to compensate third-country exporters for the EU expansion in 2004, and 
(3) a WTO panel decision declaring some EU sugar export subsidies to be 
incompatible with the EU’s WTO commitments.
The EU’s CMO for sugar is a complex mix of policy instruments that 
includes price support, production quotas for sugar and sugar substitutes, 
export subsidies, and import barriers. However, the reform targeted only a 
few of these instruments, principally cutting the intervention price 36 percent 
to discourage domestic production and sugar imports from the LDCs under 
the EBA Initiative. In addition, the reform included a voluntary buyout 
scheme for production quotas and the disallowance of exports of nonquota 
sugar to rein in domestic production and to bring export subsidies within the 
WTO limits.
Other policies that would have enhanced internal competition and made 
the EU sugar industry more efﬁ  cient were not included in the reform. For 
example, interstate quota trading, which could induce a signiﬁ  cant shift 
in production from high- to low-cost regions, was not included, leaving in 
place the allocation of production quotas on a national basis. Also, restric-
tive production quotas on sugar substitutes remain in place, albeit at higher 
levels, preventing greater competition among different types of sweeteners. 
Despite substantial concentration in the EU sugar industry and the industry’s 
noncompetitive pricing, the reform (which does not lower import barriers) 
does nothing to affect either industrial concentration or price transparency. 
Consequently, market prices of sugar, which tend to operate at levels above 
intervention prices, may fall by less than the cut in the intervention price.
The analysis suggests that, given the market structure of the EU sugar 
industry, cutting the intervention price alone may not have the desired effect 
on market prices and production. The reform’s impact on production likely 
will depend more on the amount of sugar quota that is removed from the 
market. This, in turn, will depend on the extent of industry consolidation 
and restructuring. The ﬁ  rst 2 years of the reform (2006 and 2007) have been 
marked by a wave of factory closures and reallocation of production across 
plants and countries. This restructuring generally did not result in individual 
member states abandoning a sufﬁ  ciently large quota volume to reduce produc-
tion to levels anticipated by the EU Commission. Rather, the member states 
have reallocated their quota volumes internally among their own processing 
plants. Thus, the net decline in quota production was smaller than expected—
just over 1 million tons, or 5.4 percent of total quota production in 2005. 
Subsequently, the EU Commission made quota renouncement more attractive 
and bought out more than 1.5 million metric tons, although the Commission 41
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expects that a permanent cut of over 1 million metric tons will be necessary 
in 2010 to balance EU supply with demand.
For sugar beet producers, the cuts in the intervention prices, combined 
with a more lucrative buyback of quota, may induce lower sugar output 
if these measures make other economic opportunities more attractive. 
Producers still can shift some sugar beets to ethanol production and collect 
the energy subsidy. Moreover, given the rising cereal prices induced by 
expanded demand, sugar beet producers could shift to cereals—mostly 
wheat (typically grown in rotation with sugar beets), particularly in regions 
with higher production costs. Nevertheless, a more complete sugar reform 
that includes lower import barriers (outside preferential agreements), 
inter-country quota tradability, and greater market opportunities for sugar 
substitutes would improve the efﬁ  ciency of the industry by weakening 
oligopolistic behavior, enhancing internal competition, and providing a 
larger scope for output contraction.
Trade effects of the EU sugar reform suggest that the concomitant imple-
mentation of the EBA Initiative in 2009 and the EU reform (which started 
in 2006) will dampen the gains for LDCs as they face greater competition 
from other exporters to the EU. For non-LDC exporters among the African-
Caribbean-Paciﬁ  c (ACP) countries, the possibility of increased sugar exports 
to the EU may be tempered by lost income due to preference erosion and the 
lower quota rents associated with reduced support prices received by prefer-
ential exporters. However, for nonpreferential exporters, the direct implica-
tions of the EU reform for bilateral trade are small, owing to the dominance 
of the EU’s preferential sugar agreements.
The EU sugar reform is expected to exert upward pressure on world sugar 
prices, but such price increases are likely to be overtaken by much larger 
price hikes due to rising demand for sugar in order to produce ethanol, 
mostly from Brazil. Increasing use of sugarcane for Brazilian ethanol produc-
tion means tighter world sugar supplies and higher prices. This development 
could help many of the ACP sugar producers who face an erosion of prefer-
ence beneﬁ  ts from the EU sugar policy reforms. Sugar exporters from the 
ACP countries and the LDCs would not be the only beneﬁ  ciaries of rising 
world sugar prices. Some countries could become producers of sugarcane-
based ethanol and contribute to the expanding global biofuel market.
Finally, the reform could have important implications for the WTO. While 
the reform reduces EU sugar export subsidies to within the current WTO 
limits, it also could serve as the ﬁ  rst step in a phased removal of these subsi-
dies under the Doha Development Round. In the area of domestic support, 
cuts in the intervention price and lower sugar production may reduce the 
EU’s aggregate measure of support. However, in the area of market access, 
the reform does not address the high import barriers outside preferential 
agreements. The ad valorem level of these barriers is estimated at more than 
160 percent. Signiﬁ  cant tariff cuts for sugar of about 60-90 percent, like 
those tabled in the 2005 WTO meeting in Hong Kong, would not only have a 
greater impact on world sugar markets but would affect EU sugar trade with 
nonpreferential trading partners.42
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